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2051 
PRIVACY’S DOUBLE STANDARDS 
Scott Skinner-Thompson* 
Abstract: Where the right to privacy exists, it should be available to all people. If not 
universally available, then privacy rights should be particularly accessible to marginalized 
individuals who are subject to greater surveillance and are less able to absorb the social costs 
of privacy violations. But in practice, there is evidence that people of privilege tend to fare 
better when they bring privacy tort claims than do non-privileged individuals. This disparity 
occurs despite doctrine suggesting that those who occupy prominent and public social positions 
are entitled to diminished privacy tort protections. 
This Article unearths disparate outcomes in public disclosure tort cases and uses the 
unequal results as a lens to expand our understanding of how constitutional equality principles 
might be used to rejuvenate beleaguered privacy tort law. Scholars and the U.S. Supreme Court 
have long recognized that the First Amendment applies to the substance of tort law, under a 
theory that state action is implicated by private tort lawsuits because judges (state actors) make 
the substantive rule of decision and enforce the law. Under this theory, the First Amendment 
has been used to limit the scope of privacy and defamation torts as infringing on the privacy 
invader’s speech rights. But, as this Article argues, if state action applies to tort law, other 
constitutional provisions should also bear on the substance of common law torts. 
This Article highlights the selective application of constitutional law to tort law. It uses the 
unequal effects of prevailing public disclosure tort doctrine to explore whether constitutional 
equality principles can be used to reform, or nudge, the currently weak protections provided 
by blackletter privacy tort law. By so doing, this Article also foregrounds a doctrinally-sound 
basis for a broader discussion of how constitutional liberty, due process, and equality norms 
might influence tort law across a variety of substantive contexts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
If a right exists, bedrock principles of American law generally demand 
that the right be equally available to all.1 A plaintiff who is black should 
have the same substantive law applied to her claim as a plaintiff who is 
                                                     
1. So unassailable is this tenet that the U.S. Supreme Court etched the phrase, “Equal Justice Under 
Law,” on the front of the court building in the 1930s. Visitor’s Guide to the Court, SUPREME COURT 
OF THE UNITED STATES, https://www.supremecourt.gov/visiting/visitorsguide-supremecourt.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/45N5-H346]; see also Caldwell v. Texas, 137 U.S. 692, 697 (1891) (“[N]o [s]tate 
can deprive particular persons or classes of persons of equal and impartial justice under the law. . . . 
And due process is so secured by laws operating on all alike . . . .”). 
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white, with similar results for similar claims.2 And although concrete 
evidence of systematic, unequal judicial results is hard to uncover,3 it is 
widely acknowledged that in many contexts the law does not, in fact, 
operate with an even hand.4 The white plaintiff prevails where the black 
plaintiff fails. Can equality, as a principle of American law, become more 
than hortatory? How can the law be adjusted to operate more equally, and 
how can those adjustments be doctrinally justified and grounded? This 
Article seeks to answer these questions in a particular legal context—the 
tort of public disclosure of private facts—and to draw lessons from those 
results for privacy tort reform and the constitutionalization of tort law 
more broadly. “Constitutionalization of tort law” refers to the injection of 
constitutional principles, such as equal protection, into the substance of 
common law causes of action.5 
This Article’s systematic review of public disclosure tort cases over the 
past decade reveals that, instead of being applied equally and universally,6 
                                                     
2. See Paul Gowder, Equal Law in an Unequal World, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1021, 1023 (2014) 
(describing the ideal that the law must apply equally as “a fundamental demand of legal morality”). 
3. But it is not impossible. There are examples of detailed research documenting inequity within 
different judicial contexts and several task forces have been set up to research bias within the judicial 
system. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 293–96 (1987) (discussing empirical evidence 
that Georgia’s death penalty was being applied in a racially disproportionate manner); Gender and 
Racial Fairness: State Links, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., http://www.ncsc.org/Topics/Access-and-
Fairness/Gender-and-Racial-Fairness/State-Links.aspx?cat=Racial Fairness Task Forces and Reports 
[https://perma.cc/8538-SE9N] (collecting reports documenting unfairness within various state 
judicial systems).  
4. See, e.g., MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY: RACE, 
GENDER, AND TORT LAW 46 (Debbie Gershenowitz ed., 2010) (explaining that while “[g]ender and 
race may have vanished from the face of tort law,” they play an outsized role in determining whether 
a plaintiff’s injury will be recognized and valued); Russell K. Robinson, Unequal Protection, 68 
STAN. L. REV. 151, 154–55 (2016) (outlining how the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the Equal 
Protection Clause more favorably in claims brought by same-sex couples compared to race or gender 
discrimination claims). 
5. See Thomas B. Colby, The Constitutionalization of Torts?, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 357, 357–58 
(2016) (discussing the U.S. Supreme Court’s use of constitutional due process principles to limit 
punitive damages). 
6. A chart cataloging each of the cases is available at: https://www.law.uw.edu/wlr/online-
edition/scott-skinner-thompson. For a detailed discussion of the research methodology used to locate, 
analyze, and code public disclosure tort cases and the limitations to that methodology, see infra 
Appendix A. By providing a detailed research methodology, this Article attempts to pick up the 
mantle of important critiques regarding the lack of systematic rigor and transparency in legal 
scholarship attempting to make claims about trends within doctrine. See, e.g., William Baude, Adam 
S. Chilton, & Anup Malani, Making Doctrinal Work More Rigorous: Lessons from Systematic 
Reviews, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 37, 40 (2017) (stating that it is “suboptimal” that the norm of citation in 
legal academia does not include conducting any type of systematic review); Mark A. Hall & Ronald 
F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 63, 63 (2008) 
(“[D]espite . . . innovative efforts to study legal doctrines and institutions through different lenses, 
legal scholars have yet to identify their own unique empirical methodology.”). 
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the public disclosure tort has at times been used to great effect by people 
of privilege and has been largely ineffective for those in precarious social 
positions.7 For example, despite doctrine suggesting that public figures 
surrender privacy protections because they have exposed themselves to 
the public,8 publicity-hungry celebrities, such as former professional 
wrestler, Hulk Hogan, have succeeded in their privacy claims where 
others,9 such as outed gay men and female victims of revenge porn, have 
frequently failed.10 
But why use the public disclosure tort and privacy law as a means of 
examining whether the common law can be made more equal in practice? 
The public disclosure of private facts tort provides fertile ground for 
investigating whether the common law benefits the privileged at the 
expense of the marginalized because the tort, by its terms, is supposed to 
disfavor privileged plaintiffs.11 As noted, under blackletter privacy tort 
law, celebrities and public figures are purportedly entitled to diminished 
                                                     
7. “Privilege” can exist in many forms and people may be privileged in certain contexts, but not 
others. Similarly, people can be made vulnerable or marginalized in multiple, intersecting ways, but 
be privileged in other spaces. As used throughout, the concepts of privilege and marginalization are 
dynamic and may not align perfectly with the relatively narrow categories of protected classes 
recognized under traditional equal protection analysis. While that lack of alignment with traditional 
equal protection categories arguably weakens the Article’s doctrinal suggestion that equal protection 
principles can be used to influence private tort law, that disconnect between divergent privacy tort 
outcomes and equal protection categories serves to underscore and shine a critical light on a weak 
point of equal protection doctrine generally. Cf. Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the 
Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist 
Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 140 (1989) (explaining how people may 
be multiply-burdened by intersecting forms of marginalization and that “the intersectional experience 
is greater than the sum of racism and sexism”); Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: 
Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 2–6 (2008) (outlining the 
impoverished concept of equality in American law and proposing a more substantive approach that 
considers how vulnerability is a constant of the human condition and a product of more than the rigid 
identity-based typologies of equal protection law).   
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
9. Nick Madigan & Ravi Somaiya, Hulk Hogan Awarded $115 Million in Privacy Suit Against 
Gawker, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/19/business/media/gawker-
hulk-hogan-verdict.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2018) (documenting that a jury awarded Hogan 
damages equaling $115 million in his privacy suit against Gawker: $55 million for economic harm 
and $60 million for emotional distress); Nick Madigan, Jury Tacks on $25 Million to Gawker’s Bill 
in Hulk Hogan Case, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/22/business/media/hulk-hogan-damages-25-million-gawker-
case.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2018) [hereinafter Madigan, Jury Tacks on $25 Million] (noting that 
an additional $25 million in punitive damages was awarded to Hogan). 
10. See, e.g., Doe v. Peterson, 784 F. Supp. 2d 831, 834, 843 (E.D. Mich. 2011) (dismissing 
invasion of privacy claims in revenge porn case because pictures at issue had already been posted on 
another website); Bilbrey v. Myers, 91 So. 3d 887, 892 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (dismissing public 
disclosure claim by outed, allegedly-gay man because of insufficient publicity).  
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
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privacy rights because of the newsworthiness of their lives—meaning that 
the First Amendment right to free speech protects efforts to disclose 
information about such privileged individuals.12 Therefore, any disparity 
in results between privileged and marginalized plaintiffs is all the more 
suggestive that the common law—on the ground—is not operating 
equally. 
Moreover, on a normative level, privacy law is a uniquely appropriate 
area for examining inequality because privacy rights are particularly 
important for marginalized communities. Marginalized communities are 
disproportionately surveilled and subject to privacy violations.13 To the 
extent persons from marginalized groups experience privacy violations, 
they may be less able to absorb the social and economic costs that flow 
from the exposure of their sensitive information.14 And privacy can serve 
as a liminal or transitional right until such communities gain both formal 
anti-discrimination protections and lived equality.15 For example, the right 
to privacy over one’s minority sexual orientation may be key until such 
time as queer identity becomes more broadly protected.16 Privacy over 
intimate images shared with a lover-turned-vindictive-ex may serve 
important gender-equality principles.17 But privacy law cannot begin to 
achieve anti-subordination goals if it is not operating equally in practice. 
Beyond revealing concrete evidence of disparate outcomes, which, by 
itself, is important to document, this Article’s results suggest that certain 
doctrinal reforms are necessary for privacy tort law to provide meaningful 
protections for all—including marginalized people. And this Article 
                                                     
12. DAVID A. ELDER, PRIVACY TORTS § 3.16 (2016); cf. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (concluding that the First Amendment protects speech regarding issues of public 
concern, including speech regarding public officials). 
13. Mary A. Franks, Democratic Surveillance, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 425, 441 (2017) (“The 
surveillance of marginalized populations has a long and troubling history. Race, class, and gender 
have all helped determine who is watched in society, and the right to privacy has been unequally 
distributed according to the same factors.”); Scott Skinner-Thompson, Performative Privacy, 50 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1673, 1738 (2017) (documenting the different ways various marginalized populations 
are surveilled). 
14. Michele E. Gilman, The Class Differential in Privacy Law, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1389, 1403–04 
(2012) (describing the myriad harms that can result from privacy invasions in impoverished 
communities). 
15. See, e.g., Scott Skinner-Thompson, Outing Privacy, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 159, 176 (2015) 
(arguing that informational privacy’s value “is particularly significant for communities in transition”). 
16. Anita L. Allen, Privacy Torts: Unreliable Remedies for LGBT Plaintiffs, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 
1711, 1764 (2010) (“As long as intolerance and discrimination against LGBT individuals remain, the 
need for seclusion, secrecy, and selective self-disclosure will remain as well.”). 
17. See DANIELLE K. CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 13–17 (2014) (explaining that cyber 
harassment, including the non-consensual disclosure of intimate images or “revenge porn,” 
disproportionately impacts women). 
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represents one of the few examples of an emerging field taking a critical 
approach to tort theory and tort law, which is often dominated by 
economic approaches.18 
Specifically, the cases explored in this Article demonstrate that two of 
the public disclosure tort’s requirements—the complete secrecy 
requirement and the widespread disclosure requirement—combine to 
create what I call the “secrecy double standard.”19 This double standard—
requiring plaintiffs to keep their information totally secret prior to 
bringing a claim but, at the same time, not permitting claims unless the 
defendant disclosed the information to a significant number of people—
greatly limits public disclosure tort claims. And, in practice, there is 
reason to believe that the tandem effect of these two requirements 
disproportionately impacts marginalized communities who are forced to 
live in situations where they are unable to keep information private ex 
ante.20 Moreover, the standard itself is unequally applied, with those in 
privileged positions (often celebrities) being permitted more leeway with 
their privacy claims—notwithstanding that under established doctrine, 
public figures are, at least in theory, entitled to less privacy.21 In this way, 
the tort’s unequal application among plaintiffs operates as a second double 
standard. Documenting these trends will be central to the deconstruction 
of the secrecy double standard and will aid efforts to revitalize privacy 
tort law. 
In particular, as one of this Article’s critical contributions, unearthing 
evidence that tort law is operating with unequal results suggests that there 
may be a place for constitutional equality principles to influence the shape 
                                                     
18. See CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 4, at 16 (explaining that critical legal theory has 
rarely been applied to tort law and that this “invisibility from tort theory creates the misimpression 
that left-leaning theories and discourses have no value for tort law”); id. at 40 (“[This] body of critical 
torts scholarship is still quite small . . . .”). 
19. See infra Part I. Arguably, holding plaintiffs and defendants to different standards with regard 
to the protection of plaintiffs’ information is less of a double standard and more of a paradox, but the 
double standard frame helps foreground that widely divergent burdens and duties are being imposed 
on different parties’ obligations to keep information secret. 
20. See Neal K. Katyal, Architecture as Crime Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1039, 1129 (2002) (“Privacy 
in America today is a luxury good that the poor often lack the resources to secure. Privacy is about 
controlling the boundaries of one’s exposure, and if a person can be attacked by others, or if her 
property can be invaded, it is a fundamental violation of these boundaries.”); Sarah Swan, Home 
Rules, 64 DUKE L.J. 823, 852 (2015) (documenting the lack of privacy available to those living in 
federal housing projects). 
21. See ELDER, supra note 12, § 3.16 (describing the decreased amount of privacy protections for 
public figures). 
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and direction of common law doctrine.22 For over fifty years,23 the U.S. 
Supreme Court has accepted that tort law—even though it involves suits 
between private parties—implicates state action, because governments 
(judges) both enforce the law and separately make the common law; they 
establish the rules of the game.24 Accordingly, the First Amendment 
applies to efforts to limit speech through tort law. Thus far, as it relates to 
the substantive contours of a given tort, courts and scholars have focused 
on the First Amendment’s grant of free speech to cabin tort law efforts to 
regulate and penalize those who spread secrets or falsehoods.25 But if state 
action attaches to tort law and the First Amendment therefore applies, 
other constitutional provisions ought to apply too, including equal 
protection principles. This Article suggests one way that constitutional 
equality principles could be used to invigorate the substance of privacy 
tort law and, more broadly, open the door to a more capacious 
understanding of how constitutional law and norms can influence 
substantive tort doctrine.26 In other words, this Article moves beyond a 
                                                     
22. As will be discussed in more detail but important to emphasize at the outset, I do not envision 
actual lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of privacy tort law, but instead suggest that there is a 
doctrinal foundation for the use of constitutional norms as substantive guideposts when judges craft 
the common law of privacy torts, and common law torts writ large. 
23. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964) (holding that the 
Constitution applies even in “a civil lawsuit between private parties” because in adjudicating the suit, 
“the Alabama courts have applied a state rule of law,” and “[i]t matters not that that law has been 
applied in a civil action [or] that it is common law only”); Am. Fed’n of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 
321, 326 (1941) (applying constitutional guarantees of free speech to a common law regulation of 
speech, and holding that the Fourteenth Amendment reaches state laws even if those laws are defined 
by “the judicial organ of the state”).  
24. See David A. Anderson, First Amendment Limitations on Tort Law, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 755, 
768–69 (2004) (explaining that the U.S. Supreme Court has applied the Constitution to tort law both 
because states create the “rule of law” and because the court applies or enforces the law, but that 
sometimes the Court does not distinguish between these two separate theories of state action). 
25. See, e.g., Neil M. Richards, The Limits of Tort Privacy, 9 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 357, 
365 (2011) (“Although the disclosure tort has been adopted in most states and influenced a variety of 
other kinds of privacy protections, it has always remained under something of a cloud because of its 
inherent tension with the free speech protections of the First Amendment.”); Eugene Volokh, 
Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People 
from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1123 (2000) (discussing how tort restrictions on 
the disclosure of someone’s personal information could be unconstitutional under the First 
Amendment). 
26. As discussed in Part III, courts and scholars have separately focused on the ability of 
constitutional due process rules to influence some of the procedural and remedial aspects of tort law—
principally, whether there are due process limitations on the size of punitive damages that can be 
awarded in a tort suit. See, e.g., Pac. Mut. Life Ins. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1991) (suggesting 
that punitive damages are reviewable for their constitutionality but finding no violation under the facts 
of the particular case). But application of the Constitution to such procedural or remedial rules is 
distinct from the use of constitutional law to craft the substantive rules or causes of action, a 
phenomenon that so far has occurred predominately in the relatively narrow context of the First 
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mere normative call for “equal justice under law,” by connecting the 
documented inequality with a doctrinally-based theory for adjusting tort 
law to operate more equitably. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I briefly outlines the blackletter 
requirements of the public disclosure tort, explaining how the tort’s rigid 
requirements operate, and situating the Article within existing critiques of 
the public disclosure tort. Importantly, thus far academic critiques of the 
public disclosure tort’s flimsy protections have lacked a doctrinal foothold 
to justify reforming the blackletter, which is where this Article intervenes. 
Part II systematically reviews a decade of public disclosure tort cases, 
demonstrating the significant role the secrecy double standard plays in 
limiting tort claims, while including examples of unequal results that 
highlight how privileged people tend to be treated more leniently under 
the applicable standards when they bring public disclosure lawsuits. Many 
of the public disclosure tort cases demonstrate that privacy law is often 
applied in a way that has disparate negative impacts on certain 
marginalized populations and, in some instances, evidence of disparate 
treatment also exists.27 This disparity creates a second double standard. 
Part III uses the evidence of inequality to suggest doctrinal reforms that 
could help privacy torts better achieve their goals. Here, I muster evidence 
of disparate treatment and impact to suggest that while certain 
constitutional principles, such as the First Amendment, have been used to 
limit privacy torts,28 other constitutional principles are also implicated and 
could be used to expand privacy tort protections. This study demonstrates 
that courts have been unprincipled and selective in which constitutional 
provisions they apply to the common law. This Article suggests one way 
for constitutional equality principles to shape privacy tort law by 
promoting a more nuanced, contextual approach to determining whether 
information was sufficiently safeguarded and whether the dissemination 
was sufficiently public to cause injury.29 This approach would bear in 
mind the plaintiff’s unique social position. For example, equal application 
                                                     
Amendment and so-called speech torts (e.g., privacy, defamation, and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress torts). 
27. See infra Part II. 
28. See, e.g., Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 538, 541 (1989) (holding that imposing civil 
liability against newspaper that published name of rape victim it obtained from a publicly-released 
police report was inconsistent with the First Amendment); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 
469, 496–97 (1975) (holding that it is unconstitutional under the First Amendment to impose civil 
liability on a broadcaster for publishing the name of a rape victim, which he obtained from the public 
record of a judicial proceeding).  
29. See generally HELEN F. NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, PRIVACY, AND 
THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 2–4 (2010) (discussing the importance of social context to 
determining whether a privacy violation has occurred). 
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of the widespread disclosure or publicity requirement could include 
consideration of the fact that non-privileged, non-famous people are less 
likely to have their information disclosed to the press or to the world 
precisely because they are not famous. But disclosure within limited 
confines may be no less damaging. 
Finally, Part IV addresses limitations to this Article’s approach, 
including: federalism concerns, barriers of proof associated with 
demonstrating unequal doctrinal treatment, and whether the 
constitutionalization of torts may be shortsighted or ahistorical. 
I. THE SECRECY DOUBLE STANDARD 
This Part provides a brief overview of the public disclosure tort’s 
blackletter requirements, details the built-in substantive inequality of the 
tort, and situates this Article’s analysis within existing critiques that 
highlight how the tort’s rigid requirements prevent it from fulfilling its 
goals. Although existing critiques are sometimes followed by suggestions 
for reforming the public disclosure tort, often the reforms are not 
buttressed by or grounded in a doctrinal defense—that is, other than 
pointing to a desire for more privacy, it is unclear how desired and 
suggested common law reforms will overcome existing blackletter tort 
law. In Parts II and III, this Article goes further by providing concrete 
evidence that the blackletter is not providing privacy protection and by 
using that evidence to bolster a doctrinal, constitutional justification for 
adapting the common law—namely, that just as First Amendment 
principles have been used to limit the tort, so too can equality principles 
be used to bolster it. 
A. The Blackletter’s Built-in Inequality 
The public disclosure of private information tort is one of four so-called 
“privacy” torts included in the Restatement of Torts.30 Its early origins are 
credited to the famous law review article written by Samuel Warren and 
Louis Brandeis.31 The disclosure tort, along with the other three privacy 
                                                     
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
31. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 198–207, 
213–16 (1890). 
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torts,32 was further refined by William Prosser.33 Prosser, who served as 
the chief reporter for the Second Restatement of Torts, included his 
privacy tort taxonomy in the Restatement, and it has been adopted by a 
majority of states.34 
Today, the Restatement provides in Section 652D that: 
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of 
another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of [their] 
privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be 
highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of 
legitimate concern to the public.35 
Distilled, the tort includes four elements. To succeed, a plaintiff must 
demonstrate that the defendant (1) gave “publicity” to (e.g., widely 
disseminated), (2) completely private/secret information, (3) that was 
“highly offensive,” and (4) not of legitimate public concern. 
Importantly, as the Restatement clarifies, the publicity requirement 
“means that the matter is made public, by communicating it to the public 
at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as 
substantially certain to become one of public knowledge.”36 This 
                                                     
32. The other three “privacy” torts are (1) intrusion upon seclusion, (2) appropriation of name or 
likeness, and (3) false light. Intrusion upon seclusion creates liability against those who make highly 
offensive invasions into one’s solitude by, for example, peering into someone’s bedroom with 
binoculars. Appropriation occurs, for example, when the defendant uses an image of the plaintiff in 
an advertisement without the plaintiff’s permission. The tort of false light occurs when a defendant 
gives publicity to information about the plaintiff so that it portrays the plaintiff in a false light and 
does so with knowledge that it would paint the plaintiff in such a light, similar to the tort of 
defamation. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
33. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389–407 (1960); see also ELDER, supra 
note 12, § 1.1 (noting Prosser’s influence on the privacy tort taxonomy). Interestingly, while not the 
focus of this Article, in other contexts highlighted by Eugene Volokh, tort law’s reliance on the 
reasonable person standard of care in order to avoid negligence claims has encouraged the invasion 
of individual privacy through what Volokh identifies as “privacy-implicating precautions.” See 
Eugene Volokh, Tort Law vs. Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 879, 886 (2014). 
34. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 487–88 (1975) (noting the impact of both 
the article by Warren and Brandeis and Prosser’s contribution to the development of privacy tort law); 
AMY GAJDA, THE FIRST AMENDMENT BUBBLE: HOW PRIVACY AND PAPARAZZI THREATEN A FREE 
PRESS 29–32 (2015) (discussing Prosser’s role in shaping privacy tort doctrine); Neil M. Richards & 
Daniel J. Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1887, 1889–90 (2010) 
(noting that while he “did not create tort privacy,” Prosser provided it “order and visibility” and that 
“[c]ourts readily embraced Prosser’s formulation of privacy tort law”).  
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (gendered language 
removed). 
36. Id. § 652D cmt. a; see ELDER, supra note 21, § 3.3 (2018) (collecting several cases where the 
publicity requirement has been interpreted narrowly and describing application of the rule as often 
“knee-jerk”); Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common 
Law Tort, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 957, 987 (1989) (describing the consequences of the publicity 
requirement as “undoubtedly harsh”).  
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requirement is in direct contrast to the less onerous “publication” 
requirement of the defamation tort targeting dissemination of false (as 
opposed to true) information, which requires only “that the defamatory 
matter be communicated to someone other than the person defamed.”37 In 
other words, to be liable for the tort of public disclosure, the dissemination 
of the information must be fairly broad and widespread. 
Conversely, with regard to the “private information” requirement, the 
Restatement provides that “[t]here is no liability when the defendant 
merely gives further publicity to information about the plaintiff that is 
already public. Thus there is no liability for giving publicity to facts about 
the plaintiff’s life that are matters of public record . . . .”38 Similarly, 
“there is no liability for giving further publicity to what the plaintiff 
himself leaves open to the public eye.”39 As demonstrated by this Article’s 
survey of public disclosure tort cases outlined in Part II, this requirement 
is often interpreted to bar a plaintiff’s claim even if the plaintiff previously 
shared the information at issue within extremely limited confines.40 This 
requirement for complete secrecy is, at least in part, an outgrowth of the 
First Amendment’s application to the substance of the privacy torts—the 
Restatement cites to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Cox 
Broadcasting Co. v. Cohn,41 as requiring that “under the First Amendment 
there can be no recovery for disclosure of and publicity to facts that are a 
matter of public record.”42 
Together, these first two requirements work to form what I refer to as 
the “secrecy double standard.” To have a claim, plaintiffs must essentially 
keep the information at issue totally private, whereas defendants, to be 
liable, need to so widely distribute the information that it becomes truly 
public information—known to many.43 
                                                     
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1977); Jonathan B. Mintz, 
The Remains of Privacy’s Disclosure Tort: An Exploration of the Private Domain, 55 MD. L. REV. 
425, 437 (1996) (noting the different levels of publicity required for the public disclosure privacy tort 
and defamation, and that a small number of courts are more forgiving to plaintiffs in terms of how 
widespread the disclosure must be to state a claim). 
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
39. Id.  
40. See infra section II.C. 
41. 420 U.S. 469 (1975). 
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, Special Note on Relation of § 652D to the First 
Amendment to the Constitution (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (citing Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 496–
97). 
43. Mintz, supra note 37, at 441 (“[D]efendants may disclose a private fact about a plaintiff to two 
persons without invading that plaintiff’s privacy at all, but plaintiffs who expose the same fact to the 
same two persons ‘in public’ have destroyed their privacy interest in that fact entirely.”). 
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As to the highly offensive requirement, the Restatement provides that 
offensiveness is to be judged relative “to the customs of the time and 
place, to the occupation of the plaintiff and to the habits of his neighbors 
and fellow citizens.”44 Somewhat ironically given its requirement for 
complete secrecy under the “private information” requirement, the 
Restatement notes that “[c]omplete privacy does not exist in this world 
except in a desert, and anyone who is not a hermit must expect and endure 
the ordinary incidents of the community life of which he is a part.”45 The 
Restatement further emphasizes that, “[t]hus [plaintiffs] must expect the 
more or less casual observation of [their] neighbors as to what [they do], 
and that [the] comings and goings and [their] ordinary daily activities, will 
be described in the press as a matter of casual interest to others.”46 So, 
while the Restatement recognizes that complete secrecy is impossible, it 
nevertheless imposes Herculean secrecy requirements on plaintiffs.47 
Finally, even if the information is highly offensive, a plaintiff cannot 
prevail if it is a matter of legitimate public concern.48 Here, the 
Restatement provides a circular definition of the scope of public concern: 
noting that “news” items are of legitimate public concern, and that “[t]o a 
considerable extent, in accordance with the mores of the community, the 
publishers and broadcasters have themselves defined the term, as a glance 
at any morning paper will confirm.”49 As to the “legitimate public 
concern” and the “private information” requirements, the Restatement 
largely provides that public figures are entitled to greatly diminished 
                                                     
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1977).  
45. Id.  
46. Id.  
47. Cf. Andrew E. Taslitz, Privacy as Struggle, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 501, 505 (2007) (critiquing 
privacy jurisprudence in the Fourth Amendment context because “the Court’s requirement of 
superhuman individual efforts to attain secrecy, that is, totally veiling one’s activities from the state’s 
prying eyes as an essential prerequisite to the existence of privacy”). 
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
49. Id. § 652D cmt. g; see also GAJDA, supra note 34, at 226 (“News, at least as it currently stands 
in a legal sense, is what newspeople say it is . . . .”); Patrick J. McNulty, The Public Disclosure of 
Private Facts: There Is Life After Florida Star, 50 DRAKE L. REV. 93, 158 (2001) (“Courts have been 
loathe . . . to second-guess the media’s judgment on what constitutes news.”); Neil M. Richards, The 
Puzzle of Brandeis, Privacy, and Speech, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1343 (2010) (“American courts 
have tended to defer to the judgment of the press about what constitutes information in which there 
is a legitimate public interest.”); Rodney A. Smolla, Accounting for the Slow Growth of American 
Privacy Law, 27 NOVA. L. REV. 289, 302 (2002) (“[T]he mere fact that the material has appeared in 
a media publication often seems to go a long way, if not all the way, in establishing that the material 
is newsworthy.”); Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren & 
Brandeis’s Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 303 (1983) (explaining that many courts “have 
ultimately deferred to the media’s judgment of what is and is not newsworthy” which has had “the 
practical effect of demolishing the tort” in some jurisdictions).  
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privacy. Those “who voluntarily place[] [themselves] in the public eye,” 
including “by engaging in public activities, or by assuming a prominent 
role in institutions or activities having general . . . public interest, or by 
submitting [themselves or their] work for public judgment, cannot 
complain when [they are] given publicity that [they have] sought, even 
though it may be unfavorable.”50 
B. Existing Critiques Fail to Justify Privacy Tort Reform 
Other scholars have also observed that privacy tort law suffers from 
major shortcomings. Indeed, some have suggested that the public 
disclosure tort is more or less dead.51 Another group, while less 
pessimistic in their analysis, has nevertheless documented the tort’s 
limited vitality.52 While these critiques sometimes accompany 
suggestions for reforming privacy tort law, thus far, the suggestions have 
been largely result-oriented and have neglected to provide a rationale 
based in existing law for those modifications.53 While I share their 
normative impulse that more robust privacy tort protections are useful and 
                                                     
50. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (gendered language 
removed). 
51. See, e.g., Samantha Barbas, The Death of the Public Disclosure Tort: A Historical Perspective, 
22 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 171, 172 (2010) (“[F]or all intents and purposes, the public disclosure of 
private facts tort . . . is generally regarded as ‘dead.’”); Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law: Were 
Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 328 (1966) (arguing that the public 
disclosure tort should not be resuscitated because it is petty and lacks doctrinal coherence); McNulty, 
supra note 49, at 129 (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court’s Florida Star decision “seems to sound 
the death knell for the public disclosure tort”); Mintz, supra note 37, at 426 (“Whether with dire 
warning, hand-wringing lament, or righteous affirmation, one third of the Supreme Court and most 
of privacy academia have pronounced dead the more than century-old tort of public disclosure of 
private facts.”); Zimmerman, supra note 49, at 363–65 (suggesting that efforts to revive the public 
disclosure tort be laid to rest and, instead, effort be focused on developing statutory protections against 
electronic eavesdropping and the development of information data banks, among other initiatives).  
52. Allen, supra note 16, at 1711 (“[T]he theoretically promising invasion of privacy torts have too 
often been practical disappointments for LGBT plaintiffs . . . .” (emphasis omitted)); Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Rediscovering Brandeis’s Right to Privacy, 45 BRANDEIS L.J. 643, 657 (2007) (“Tort 
law and statutes must do a better job of providing for liability for those who reveal deeply personal 
information about individuals.”); Julie E. Cohen, Privacy, Ideology, and Technology: A Response to 
Jeffrey Rosen, 89 GEO. L.J. 2029, 2043 (2001) (arguing that while it is “an overstatement to say that 
the common law is incapable of change,” it is nonetheless “becoming increasingly clear that the 
common law invasion of privacy torts will not help to contain the destruction of informational 
privacy”); Ruth Gavison, Too Early for a Requiem: Warren and Brandeis Were Right on Privacy vs. 
Free Speech, 43 S.C. L. REV. 437, 451 (1992) (“[I]t is not true that . . . legal remedies for the 
publication of true information about individuals are almost nonexistent and probably 
unconstitutional.”); Smolla, supra note 49, at 296 (noting that while the publication tort is the 
quintessential privacy tort, it has been severely weakened); Richards, supra note 25, at 365 
(“Although liability in privacy cases appears to be rare, . . . the four privacy torts remain alive . . . .”).  
53. See infra notes 55–70. 
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important,54 in order for the common law to actually adapt, courts must be 
pointed toward a doctrinal basis for doing so. 
For example, Daniel Solove and Neil Richards have argued that privacy 
tort law has been severely limited by Prosser’s formulation, and that we 
must move beyond his conception of privacy torts.55 In particular, they 
lament that the rigid four categories of privacy torts prevent tort law from 
adapting “to new privacy problems such as the extensive collection, use, 
and disclosure of personal information by businesses,” and that privacy 
torts “have struggled in recognizing more nuanced understandings of 
privacy in terms of levels of accessibility of information.”56 Among other 
suggestions for improving privacy tort law, Solove and Richards rightly 
recommend that tort law better appreciate the “gradations between purely 
public and purely private.”57 Relatedly, Lior Strahilevitz has persuasively 
suggested that social networks theory could be used to reorient the 
disclosure tort away from the prevailing vague and inconsistent 
reasonable expectation of privacy inquiry towards an empirical one 
centered on whether “the defendant’s actions materially affect[ed] the 
extent of subsequent disclosure.”58 In other words, if there was a pre-
existing ex ante likelihood that the information at issue would be spread 
beyond the plaintiff’s existing social network when the plaintiff first 
disclosed the information, then the defendant’s disclosure of the 
information beyond that network would be less likely to be actionable.59 
                                                     
54. In contrast to the several scholars who have noted the limited viability of the public disclosure 
tort, Amy Gajda has recently argued that “courts are showing a new willingness to limit public 
disclosure of truthful information.” GAJDA, supra note 34, at 3. Gajda goes so far as to suggest that 
privacy rights are threatening the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of the press. Id. at 4. As 
this Article suggests, Gajda’s claim may hold true for plaintiffs in privileged positions, but it is less 
clear that that the public disclosure tort is operating with great effect generally. 
55. Richards & Solove, supra note 34, at 1891. 
56. Id. at 1918, 1920; see also Allen, supra note 16, at 1749 (observing how the narrowly 
constructed “publication” and “private fact” requirements have often stymied LGBT plaintiffs, and 
that if the tort is to provide robust protection for LGBT people, courts will need to rethink the degree 
to which they penalize plaintiffs who selectively disclose their minority sexual orientation or 
transgender status); Kathleen Guzman, About Outing: Public Discourse, Private Lives, 73 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 1531, 1590 (1995) (arguing that, as currently constructed, the public disclosure tort provides 
little refuge to those who are victims of “outings” of their minority sexual orientation and, as part of 
her solution, suggesting courts recognize that private information “embraces much more than pure 
secrecy” and that a “contrary view actually perpetuates the closet as the proper milieu for lesbians 
and gay men”). 
57. Richards & Solove, supra note 34, at 1922. 
58. Lior J. Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 975 (2005). 
59. Id. 
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Danielle Citron has also astutely observed that, in its current form, 
privacy tort law is ill-suited to deal with today’s modern technologies.60 
Specifically, she has argued that privacy torts could be reinvigorated, in 
part, with a returned focus to Warren and Brandeis’s concept of the “right 
to be left alone”—that is, she advocates a more expansive understanding 
of the harms at stake in privacy violations.61 And while Citron does a 
laudable job of mustering real-world evidence to show how technology 
magnifies the harm of privacy disclosures,62 we still lack a doctrinal, 
authoritative justification for a broader conception of harm, other than the 
Warren and Brandeis article.63 
Jonathan Mintz, too, has noted that courts have imposed severe 
limitations on the public disclosure tort, but suggests that the tort will 
remain viable so long as the information at issue has resided in “a zone of 
fair intimate disclosure” and that people ought to be able to transmit 
information within this zone “without losing their right to protect that 
information’s private status.”64 But Mintz defines the protected zone he 
advocates with reference to the Fourth Amendment reasonable 
expectation of privacy test,65 which itself remains a very weak and 
subjective tool for privacy protection and is still beholden to the 
                                                     
60. Danielle K. Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1805, 1809 (2010); see 
also Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1291 (2000) 
(observing that the privacy torts are too narrow to cope with modern data privacy concerns). 
61. Citron, supra note 60, at 1851 (“Perhaps courts could avoid rewriting the standard of proof 
required for privacy torts by considering the Internet’s magnifying and distorting 
impact . . . . Moreover, courts could apply the four privacy torts to privacy harms caused by newer 
technologies with an eye toward the goals sought by Warren and Brandeis.”). 
62. Id. at 1811–18. 
63. Citron also raises the possibility that “mainstream” torts (that is, non-privacy torts) might be 
used to protect privacy. For example, she suggests that the tort of enablement of criminal conduct 
might be used to encourage website operators to remove content that might put individuals in danger, 
but she recognizes that application of the tort may run into barriers, such as section 230(c)(1) of the 
Communications Decency Act, which immunizes website operators from liability for the posts put up 
on their websites by third parties. Id. at 1837–42. 
64. Mintz, supra note 37, at 461. 
65. Id. at 461 n.232. 
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paralyzing third-party doctrine,66 as Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
lays bare.67 
Finally, a number of scholars have argued that if plaintiffs are able to 
somehow link their disclosure claim to an intrusion claim and show that 
improper collection followed by improper dissemination occurred, they 
are more likely to succeed. 68 For example, Rodney Smolla has suggested 
that if plaintiffs are able to show that both intrusion and disclosure 
interests are implicated, their privacy claims will be stronger.69 And, 
indeed, the Restatement itself seems to recognize that many privacy 
invasions will involve both intrusion upon seclusion and dissemination.70 
These critiques—and others71—are all on point. They help us 
understand how privacy doctrine has failed to keep up with technological 
                                                     
66. The third-party doctrine provides that, generally, no reasonable expectation of privacy exists in 
information voluntarily turned over to a third-party. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). 
While the U.S. Supreme Court recently imposed a modest limitation on the doctrine, concluding that 
a person’s cell-site location information was not voluntarily shared and therefore subject to collection 
without a warrant, the doctrine is far from being a dead letter. Carpenter v. United States,  
585 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018). 
67. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“What a person knowingly exposes to the 
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”). 
68. See Allen, supra note 16, at 1715 (arguing that in the context of LGBT plaintiffs, many 
plaintiffs assert more than one of the four privacy torts, which challenges the integrity and usefulness 
of maintaining formal categories); Josh Blackman, Omniveillance, Google, Privacy in Public, and the 
Right to Your Digital Identity: A Tort for Recording and Disseminating an Individual’s Image Over 
the Internet, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 313, 314–15 (2009) (proposing a tort that combines elements 
of the disclosure and intrusion torts to combat recording of public activity); Richards, The Limits of 
Tort Privacy, supra note 25, at 383–84 (suggesting that a hybrid intrusion/disclosure tort may help 
resolve some of the First Amendment problems with the disclosure tort).   
69. See Smolla, supra note 49, at 321–22. Relatedly, Jane Bambauer has discussed how the 
intrusion upon seclusion tort has failed to live up to its promise, but argued that, by focusing on 
improper observation of data, it could be retooled to provide meaningful privacy protections against 
information collection without unduly burdening innovation. Jane Yakowitz Bambauer, The New 
Intrusion, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 205, 209 (2012); see also A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of 
Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1537 (2000) (discussing the intrusion tort’s limitations).   
70. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A cmt. d, illus. 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1977); ELDER, 
supra note 21, § 1.1 (2018) (“The Restatement (Second) of Torts recognizes that it is not uncommon 
for two or more of the subdivisions to concurrently come into play in a fact scenario and provides an 
example . . . .”); cf. Lior J. Strahilevitz, Reunifying Privacy Law, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 2007, 2008 (2010) 
(explaining that, as conceived by Warren and Brandeis, the intrusion and disclosure torts were not 
separate and arguing that they ought to be recombined). 
71. Feminist scholars have also observed the potential for privacy law, including privacy torts, to 
reinforce stereotypical conceptions of female modesty that work to subjugate sexual freedom and 
autonomy. See, e.g., Anita L. Allen & Erin Mack, How Privacy Got Its Gender, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 
441, 459 (1990) (“Women appear in the Warren and Brandeis article as seduced wives and 
daughters.”); Amy Kapczynski, Note, Same-Sex Privacy and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 
112 YALE L.J. 1257, 1284–90 (2003) (critiquing privacy norms that operate to exclude women from 
certain jobs notwithstanding Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination); Catherine A. MacKinnon, 
Reflections on Sex Equality Under the Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1286 (1991) (observing some of the 
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changes and help us appreciate the importance of robust tort privacy 
protections, while suggesting some useful doctrinal reforms. In the next 
two sections, this Article enhances these critiques by providing 
meaningful evidence of the current doctrinal shortcomings, efficiently 
framing those shortcomings in terms of the “secrecy double standard,” 
and then pointing to a doctrinal basis for altering the current blackletter 
law: constitutional equality principles. 
II. THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE TORT IN PRACTICE: A SECOND 
DOUBLE STANDARD 
In practice, the requirement that plaintiffs keep information at issue 
completely secret and that defendants widely disseminate the information 
(together, the “secrecy double standard”) are sometimes applied 
differently to different classes of plaintiffs and also have a disparate 
impact on certain marginalized communities.72 In other words, there is 
evidence that the secrecy double standard itself is enforced inconsistently 
among different kinds of plaintiffs, creating a second double standard. 
This Part discusses the results of a systematic review of public disclosure 
tort cases over a decade-long period. This review suggests that the tort’s 
requirements are, at times, applied inconsistently to different kinds of 
plaintiffs, with plaintiffs in privileged social positions receiving 
preferential treatment and outcomes compared to those in non-privileged 
positions. 
A. Overview of Systematic Review 
For starters, it is important to understand how unlikely plaintiffs are to 
succeed in public disclosure tort lawsuits and how limiting the widespread 
disclosure and complete secrecy requirements are in practice.73 A national 
                                                     
ways in which privacy can veil domestic abuse of women). As discussed in Part III, it is my hope that 
importing constitutional equality principles can help rebuff some of the stereotyped norms Anita 
Allen and others document.   
72. Others have documented privacy double standards in other contexts. See, e.g., Teneille R. 
Brown, Double Helix, Double Standards: Private Matters and Public People, 11 J. HEALTH CARE L. 
& POL’Y 295, 298–99 (2008) (observing that while several statutes demand intensive medical data 
from potential federal employees, the privacy of presidential candidates’ health information is largely 
safeguarded, with the public relying largely on anecdotal data to judge candidates’ health). 
73. It is necessary to underscore the importance of documenting how the public disclosure tort is 
operating on the ground. As Amy Gajda has pointed out, “despite an often Supreme Court-centric 
focus to First Amendment-related jurisprudence [and, I would add, most jurisprudence], it is also 
important to recognize what is happening below, where even trial courts can have a significant 
impact” on doctrine and the trajectory of a case given the incentive to settle after an unfavorable 
decision. GAJDA, supra note 34, at 51.   
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review of both state and federal public disclosure tort cases over a roughly 
decade-long period from 2006 to 2016 highlights the rigor of the current 
tort requirements.74 In total, decisions relating to dispositive motions (or 
those that functioned as effectively dispositive motions) occurred in 155 
public disclosure tort cases, with 157 separate case outcomes.75 In 129 of 
those instances, a judgment was entered against the party bringing the 
public disclosure claim.76 In other words, a privacy claim only survived 
twenty-eight times, or roughly 18%.77 As the below chart illustrates, the 
two principal reasons courts rejected privacy claims were (1) the 
information at issue was not disclosed widely enough by the defendant 
and (2) the plaintiff had not kept the information sufficiently secret in 
advance. More important than the specific figures (which are subject to 
some variation based on how one categorized borderline cases) is the 
general theme that the secrecy double standard operated to bar the lion’s 
share of the public disclosure cases. The chart below includes the reasons 
for decision in each of these 155 cases.78   
 
Table 1: 
Public Disclosure Tort Decisions—2006–2016 
Reason for Judgment No. of 
Judgments 
Percent of Case 
Dismissals 
Percent of All 
Case Outcomes 
Not Widely Disclosed 39 30% 25% 
Already Public/Not 
Completely Secret 
37 29% 24% 
Newsworthy 23 18% 15% 
Not Offensive 15 12% 10% 
                                                     
74. As noted previously, the methodology for locating, analyzing, and coding these cases is 
outlined in Appendix A, infra. The cases themselves are catalogued in a chart, available at: 
https://www.law.uw.edu/wlr/online-edition/scott-skinner-thompson. The most recent decade 
preceding the date of the search (Summer 2016) was chosen to give a contemporary understanding of 
how the tort was operating and, at the same time, provide a relatively broad window of time into the 
tort’s functioning, capturing a meaningful number of cases.   
75. In two cases, there were different outcomes as to different parties, bringing the total number of 
case outcomes to 157. 
76. Occasionally, the public disclosure claim was brought by the defendant as a counterclaim. 
77. Of course, this does not mean the privacy claimant ultimately prevailed, only that they survived 
the dispositive motion with the ultimate merits of their claim to be determined at subsequent stages 
of the litigation. 
78. Note that the total number of reasons for judgment accounted for in Table 1 amounts to more 
than the 157 outcomes because, in several cases, the court gave two or more justifications for granting 
judgment against the privacy claimant. 
16 - Skinner-Thompson (3).docx (Do Not Delete) 1/6/2019  12:45 PM 




26 20% 17% 
Litigation Privilege 8 6% 5% 
Other 21 16% 13% 
Survived Motion 28 N/A 18% 
Total Case Outcomes 157 N/A 100% 
 
A closer, qualitative examination of the cases further highlights the 
limiting role of both the widespread publication and complete secrecy 
requirements and the degree to which they are applied unequally among 
different kinds of plaintiffs.79 
B. The Widespread Disclosure Requirement Prevents Claims by the 
Marginalized80 
The widespread disclosure requirement has sometimes been employed 
in a draconian (and arbitrary) fashion against plaintiffs from various 
marginalized communities, stopping claims that raise serious privacy 
concerns. For example, in Bilbrey v. Myers,81 a Florida appellate court 
(with little explanation) affirmed dismissal for insufficient publicity 
where the defendant, plaintiff’s former pastor, allegedly broadcast that 
plaintiff was gay to plaintiff’s church, including to plaintiff’s fiancée’s 
father.82 The defendant also allegedly told the plaintiff’s new pastor that 
the plaintiff was gay after the plaintiff had moved away and called off his 
wedding.83 
Similarly, in Beyene v. Hilton Hotels Corp.,84 summary judgment was 
granted against plaintiff, a room service food server and native of 
Ethiopia, where it was alleged that his employer, Hilton Hotels, had 
disclosed to two or three of plaintiff’s coworkers that the plaintiff had 
                                                     
79. Often, the court decisions did not discuss plaintiffs’ and defendants’ demographic information 
(e.g., their race, age, etc.). The lack of discussion regarding demographic factors prevents statistically-
based claims (for example, that white plaintiffs tended to fare better than people of color). But, as will 
be highlighted, qualitative comparative evidence suggests that people of privilege—broadly 
defined—tend to fare better in public disclosure suits. 
80. Importantly, the descriptions of the cases that follow are taken from the court opinions (with 
the occasional media report), which often evaluate mere allegations, rather than established evidence. 
The author, of course, is not suggesting that any of the allegations discussed are, in fact, true. 
81. 91 So. 3d 887 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
82. Id. at 892. 
83. Id. at 888–89. A defamation claim, presumably based on the same conduct, was not dismissed, 
highlighting the more onerous standard imposed in public disclosure cases. Id. at 892. 
84. 815 F. Supp. 2d 235 (D.D.C. 2011).  
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received medical injections from a particular doctor.85 The court ruled that 
the disclosure was not widespread enough to survive summary 
judgment.86 Likewise, in Williams v. Wicomico County Board of 
Education,87 the court dismissed a public disclosure claim brought by an 
African-American special education teacher against his former employers 
because the disclosure was not made to the public, but instead, only to 
various individuals at plaintiff’s prospective places of employment.88 The 
information disclosed related to an altercation plaintiff had with a student. 
The plaintiff was acquitted of wrongdoing and the criminal charge ordered 
expunged.89 Notwithstanding that the disclosures by defendants were 
allegedly preventing plaintiff from obtaining new employment,90 the 
claim was dismissed for lack of sufficient publicity. And in DeBlasio v. 
Pignoli,91 a Pennsylvania appeals court held that there was inadequate 
disclosure to state a claim where surveillance cameras of a town’s holding 
cells allegedly broadcast video of the cells into the mayor’s home, where 
the mayor could monitor the detainees. 
There are several other examples of the widespread publication 
requirement being imposed strictly against individuals in precarious social 
positions.92 The widespread disclosure requirement is strictly imposed 
                                                     
85. Id. at 254.  
86. Id. 
87. 836 F. Supp. 2d 387 (D. Md. 2011).  
88. Id. at 396–98. 
89. Id. at 390. 
90. Id.  
91. 918 A.2d 822, 824 n.3 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2007). 
92. See, e.g., Edwards v. Nat’l Vision, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1179 (N.D. Ala. 2013), aff’d, 
568 Fed. App’x 854 (11th Cir. 2014) (finding insufficient publicity where information that plaintiff, 
who was black, allegedly took anger management classes was not spread outside of employment 
confines); Opperman v. Path, 87 F. Supp. 3d 1018, 1062 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (finding allegation that 
defendants transmitted plaintiffs’ cell phone address books in unencrypted manner over public WiFi 
making it available to third parties and service providers insufficient to satisfy publicity requirement); 
Armstrong v. Thompson, 80 A.3d 177, 189 (D.C. 2013) (holding that publicity element was not 
satisfied where defendant sent a “handful of letters [six] to a handful of employees at a single agency” 
informing the agency that plaintiff was under internal investigation, preventing plaintiff from 
obtaining employment at the agency); Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins., 998 F. Supp. 2d 646, 662 
(S.D. Ohio 2014), rev’d on other grounds, 663 Fed. App’x 384 (6th Cir. 2016) (finding allegation 
that defendant permitted hackers to obtain plaintiff’s personal identifying information insufficient to 
satisfy publicity requirement because disclosure was not made to the general public); Gonnering v. 
Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 420 F. Supp. 2d 660, 667 (W.D. Tex. 2006) (finding that alleged disclosure 
of plaintiff’s gay sexual orientation between recruiter and potential employer was insufficiently 
widespread to state a claim for invasion of privacy); Purcell v. Am. Legion, 44 F. Supp. 3d 1051, 
1061 (E.D. Wash. 2014) (finding disclosure of plaintiff’s health information to two unprivileged co-
workers insufficient to satisfy publicity requirement); Mayor & City Council of Richmond Hill v. 
Maia, 336 Ga. App. 555, 567–68 (2016), rev’d on other grounds, City of Richmond Hill v. Maia, 800 
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against these unprivileged persons notwithstanding the fact that if the 
person is not a public figure, his or her information is less likely to be of 
public interest and therefore disseminated to “the world.” Nonetheless, 
disclosure of that information within certain confines (for example, a 
person’s church, a person’s place of employment, or someone else’s 
home), may be no less damaging to the individual plaintiff who may lack 
the structural safeguards of privileged public figures to deal with and cope 
from the fallout from the disclosure. 
C. The Complete Secrecy Requirement Prevents Claims by the 
Marginalized 
Likewise, the requirement that the information publicized be 
completely secret has also been routinely enforced, even in egregious 
situations.93 For example, in Doe v. Peterson,94 plaintiff sued operators of 
a nude photograph website, where nude photos of plaintiff taken when she 
was a teenager and sent privately to her then-boyfriend were posted. The 
court dismissed plaintiff’s public disclosure claim, reasoning that because 
                                                     
S.E.2d 573 (Ga. 2017) (alleged disclosure by police officer of photographs documenting injuries 
sustained by teenage girl who attempted suicide to his own daughter, who attended school with the 
teen who had attempted suicide, deemed insufficient publicity notwithstanding that there was 
evidence suggesting that the photos were subsequently further shown among students at the school); 
Snavely v. AMISUB of S.C., Inc., 379 S.C. 386, 397 (S.C. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that alleged 
disclosure of plaintiff’s hepatitis to two individuals did not constitute “publicity” because the medical 
condition was not distributed to the “public at large”); Sorensen v. Barbuto, 143 P.3d 295, 301 (Utah 
Ct. App. 2006), aff’d and remanded, 177 P.3d 614 (Utah 2008) (affirming dismissal of privacy suit 
against plaintiff’s former doctor who allegedly disclosed information regarding plaintiff’s medical 
condition because disclosure was to a limited number of people, but permitting duty of confidentiality 
claim to proceed); cf. Cordts v. Chi. Tribune Co., 860 N.E.2d 444, 453 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (affirming 
dismissal of public disclosure tort where the disability claim evaluator of plaintiff’s employer 
disclosed plaintiff’s mental health information to plaintiff’s ex-wife on theory that ex-wife had 
“natural and proper interest” in the information given its potential relevance to plaintiff’s ability to 
pay support for their children as required by marital settlement agreement). But see Hudson v. Dr. 
Michael J. O’Connell’s Pain Care Ctr., Inc., 822 F. Supp. 2d 84, 97 (D.N.H. 2011) (finding sufficient 
evidence of public disclosure to deny motion to dismiss where defendant employers allegedly made 
plaintiff’s medical information, including information regarding her herpes infection, available to 
fellow colleagues at medical center where plaintiff was also a patient, and colleagues talked about her 
infection).  
93. Of course, that is not to say that the complete secrecy requirement has always been strictly 
applied, even as to plaintiffs from marginalized communities. As Lior Strahilevitz documented over 
a decade ago in older cases, there are examples of marginalized people prevailing in their disclosure 
claims notwithstanding that the information at issue had been disclosed in limited circles prior to the 
defendant’s further dissemination. Strahilevitz, supra note 58, at 921 n.4 (discussing Multimedia 
WMAZ, Inc. v. Kubach, 443 SE.2d 491, 494 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994), which held that plaintiff’s previous 
disclosure of his HIV to allegedly sixty people did not render the information public as a matter of 
law, foreclosing his tort claim).  
94. 784 F. Supp. 2d 831, 834–35 (E.D. Mich. 2011). 
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the photos had been previously posted by a different website, they were 
not private facts.95 Similarly, in Lentz v. City of Cleveland,96 the court held 
that the plaintiff police officer could not successfully bring a public 
disclosure claim pertaining to publication of his mental health history 
when, during the lawsuit, evidence was unearthed indicating that four 
years prior to the publication, the plaintiff’s mental health information had 
been discussed at a public Civil Service Commission hearing. More 
precisely, the disclosure was excused because, after the alleged disclosure, 
evidence was found indicating that the information had previously been 
disclosed.97 These examples, too, are part of a long list.98 
                                                     
95. Id. at 842.  
96. No. 1:04CV0669, 2006 WL 1489379, at *4 (N.D. Ohio May 22, 2006). 
97. Id. at *3.  
98. See Adamski v. Johnson, No. 7824 CV 2005, 2006 WL 4129308, at *77 (Pa. Com. Pl. Mar. 2, 
2006) (dismissing privacy claim because plaintiff told some of her coworkers about medical surgery 
she claimed was private and that her employer also allegedly disclosed); Holloway v. Am. Media, 
Inc., 947 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1269 (N.D. Ala. 2013) (finding no tort violation where tabloid purported 
to describe death/burial of child where mother had previously contacted media to put pressure on 
authorities to find her missing child); Buzayan v. City of Davis, 927 F. Supp. 2d 893, 902–06 (E.D. 
Cal. 2013) (finding no privacy violation where defendant prosecutor disclosed audiotape interview 
with Muslim teenager to newspaper after charges against the teen had been dropped because the teen’s 
family had also disclosed information about the incident to the media, including copies of the 
audiotape); Purzel Video GmbH v. Smoak, 11 F. Supp. 3d 1020, 1028 (D. Colo. 2014) (finding 
information about files shared through BitTorrent file sharing protocol are not protected by privacy 
tort because the files were shared and therefore public); Budik v. Howard Univ. Hosp., 986 F. Supp. 
2d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2013) (finding no privacy violation where defendant allegedly disclosed photograph 
of plaintiff because, as a doctor at a university hospital, the information was purportedly already 
public); McMann v. Doe, 460 F. Supp. 2d 259, 268–69 (D. Mass. 2006) (no privacy violation when 
picture of plaintiff was allegedly used on surreptitiously created website whose domain name was 
plaintiff’s name and website said that plaintiff “turned lives upside down,” among other comments); 
Barnhart v. Paisano Publ’ns, LLC, 457 F. Supp. 2d 590, 593 (D. Md. 2006) (granting summary 
judgment in favor of defendant magazine publisher that published photo of plaintiff, a retail clerk, 
taken when she briefly exposed her torso at a public pig roast, notwithstanding that she allegedly 
lifted her shirt within a group of about only ten people who she knew and trusted); Brown v. CVS 
Pharmacy, L.L.C., 982 F. Supp. 2d 793, 807–08 (M.D. Tenn. 2013) (barring suit against pharmacy 
for disclosing to patients that physician was under investigation because physician filed suit 
challenging the investigation, making it public); Moreno v. Hanford Sentinel, Inc., 172 Cal. App. 4th 
1125, 1130 (2009) (finding no privacy violation where high school principal allegedly submitted 
MySpace posting of a college student to the town newspaper, which republished the posting with the 
student’s full name, because student posted the writing on her public MySpace page for six days); 
Dumas v. Koebel, 841 N.W.2d 319, 325–26 (Wis. Ct. App. 2013) (finding no privacy violation where 
TV station disclosed on air that plaintiff bus driver had a nearly decade old conviction for sex work 
because information was in the public record); Keller v. Patterson, 819 N.W.2d 841, 846 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 2012) (finding no privacy violation where defendant posted fliers indicating that sex offender 
was living at particular house because information was already in public record). There are also 
examples where marginalized individuals’ intrusion upon seclusion claims have been dismissed 
pursuant to stringent understandings of that tort’s requirements. See, e.g., Horgan v. Simmons, 704 F. 
Supp. 2d 814, 821–22 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (finding that employer’s repeated insistence that plaintiff 
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Indeed, they arguably represent an even stricter application of the 
complete secrecy requirement than that imposed in one of the most highly 
criticized public disclosure cases—the case of Oliver Sipple.99 Sipple had 
intervened to help prevent a would-be assassin from shooting then-
President Gerald Ford.100 In the aftermath of the attempted assassination, 
a newspaper reporting on the event suggested that Sipple was gay, and 
that assertion was further reported by other newspapers.101 Sipple sued for 
public disclosure of private facts, but the Court of Appeal of California 
affirmed the grant of summary judgment in the defendants’ favor. The 
court concluded that even though Sipple’s family members learned of his 
sexual orientation for the first time because of the publication, his 
orientation was known to “hundreds” of others through, among other 
activities, his participation in gay parades, because he “spent a lot of time 
in [the] ‘Tenderloin’ and [the] ‘Castro,’” and because of “his friendship 
with Harvey Milk, another prominent gay.”102 The Sipple decision, while 
ignoring that information such as one’s minority sexual orientation can be 
extremely sensitive and damaging depending on the context in which it is 
shared, is in one sense less drastic than the cases discussed above because 
Sipple’s orientation was, purportedly, known to “hundreds.”103 
These examples also underscore that for many living at the margins of 
society who are subjected to high levels of government and private 
surveillance and transparent living quarters, keeping any information—
much less sensitive information—completely secret as the tort purports to 
require is a practical impossibility.104 Indeed, sharing the stigmatized 
                                                     
disclose that he was ill, resulting in disclosure of plaintiff’s HIV positive status, was insufficient 
prying to constitute an intrusion upon seclusion).  
99. See generally Sipple v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 154 Cal. App. 3d 1040 (1984).  
100. Id. at 1043.  
101. Id. at 1044.  
102. Id. at 1044, 1047.  
103. Id. at 1047. 
104. See, e.g., United States v. Pineda-Morena, 617 F.3d 1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting) (observing that people who are impoverished live in conditions where they are less able 
to construct physical barriers to maintain privacy); KHIARA M. BRIDGES, THE POVERTY OF PRIVACY 
RIGHTS 87 (2017) (describing extensive policing of the poor); JOHN GILLIOM, OVERSEERS OF THE 
POOR: SURVEILLANCE, RESISTANCE, AND THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY 30 (William M. O’Barr & John 
M. Conley eds., 2001) (documenting the widespread and sophisticated administrative welfare 
surveillance that permits the state to have a deep and broad view of the lives of those receiving state 
assistance); Khiara M. Bridges, Privacy Rights and Public Families, 34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 113, 
122–23 (2011) (documenting the “devastating absence of privacy” for “marginalized, indigent women 
who must turn to the state for assistance if they are to achieve healthy pregnancies and infants” and 
arguing that “wealth is the condition of possibility for the exercise and enjoyment of the right” to 
privacy); Franks, supra note 13, at 428 (observing that surveillance of African-Americans, women, 
and the poor is widespread); Gilman, supra note 14, at 1403–04 (outlining privacy violations of 
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information within limited confines may be necessary to mental health, 
identity exploration/play, and existence, as even the U.S. Supreme Court 
has recognized.105 Yet, the complete secrecy requirement punishes those 
who do share their intimate information within limited confines. 
D. The Privileged Prevail 
In contrast to these cases stand those like Hulk Hogan’s suit against 
Gawker. In the Hogan suit, former professional wrestler Hulk Hogan, 
whose real name is Terry Bollea, sued Gawker Media seeking damages 
from Gawker’s posting of excerpts of a sex tape between Bollea and a 
woman named Heather Clem with whom he had an affair in 2006, and an 
injunction barring Gawker from further publishing the video and related 
report.106 Excerpts of the video were posted by Gawker in October 2012, 
though media reports regarding the tape’s existence, some including still 
shots from the tape, pre-dated Gawker’s disclosure.107 Bollea filed suit 
against Gawker later that month in federal court, but after his request for 
an injunction was denied, he voluntarily dismissed the federal suit and 
sued in Florida state court.108 There, trial court Judge Pamela Campbell 
initially granted Bollea’s injunction request, but the court of appeals 
reversed the imposition of an injunction.109 On remand, Judge Campbell 
denied a motion to dismiss the case and the case proceeded to trial110 
where a jury awarded Bollea a total of $140 million in damages, consisting 
                                                     
impoverished communities); Kami Simmons & Karen E.C. Levy, The Contexts of Control: 
Information, Power, and Truck-Driving Work, 31 INFO. SOC. 160 (2015) (documenting industry 
surveillance of blue-collar truck drivers); Christopher Slobogin, The Poverty Exception to The Fourth 
Amendment, 55 FLA. L. REV. 391, 400 (2003) (“Several Court decisions define expectations of 
privacy in a way that makes people who are less well-off more likely to experience warrantless, 
suspicionless government intrusions.”); William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment 
Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1265, 1267 (1999) (“[P]rivacy can be bought, so that people who 
have money have more of it than people who don’t.”); Swan, supra note 20, at 828, 853 (highlighting 
privacy incursions authorized by “home rule ordinances” that impose vicarious liability on household 
members for the actions of others, which in turn encourage third-party surveillance and monitoring 
of people’s behavior). 
105. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (holding that criminalizing same-sex sexual 
conduct demeaned the “existence” of homosexuals, implicitly rejecting a distinction between one’s 
identity as homosexual and acting on that sexuality).  
106. See Gawker Media, LLC v. Bollea, 129 So. 3d 1196, 1198 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2014) 
(describing allegations).   
107. Id. at 1201.  
108. Id. at 1199 (outlining procedural history).  
109. Id. at 1204.  
110. Bollea v. Gawker Media, LLC, No. 12012447-CI-011, 2016 WL 1270387, at *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 
Jan. 28, 2016). 
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of $55 million in compensatory damages, $60 million for emotional 
distress, and $25 million in punitive damages.111 Gawker appealed, and 
the case ultimately settled for $31 million.112 
If the public disclosure tort’s requirement that the information at issue 
be completely secret had been applied as it was in the above cases 
involving “ordinary” people, there seems little question that Bollea’s suit 
should have been dismissed. Bollea built his career as an ostentatious 
public persona and he had not infrequently discussed his sex life with 
media outlets, including openly discussing another affair in his 2009 
autobiography.113 Bollea and his family also had their own reality 
television show from 2005 to 2007.114 Beyond being generally cavalier 
about his personal life, Bollea had specifically discussed an encounter 
with Clem on The Howard Stern Show and TMZ.115 
Moreover, stills from the video were not originally posted by Gawker, 
but were evidently published by other media outlets prior to Gawker’s 
posting in October 2012.116 Indeed, in reversing the grant of the initial 
injunction by Judge Campbell, the Florida Court of Appeals specifically 
noted that, based on Bollea’s own conduct, it was “hard-pressed to believe 
that Mr. Bollea truly desired the affair and Sex Tape to remain private or 
to otherwise be ‘swept under the rug.’”117 Nevertheless, on remand, Judge 
Campbell permitted the case to go to trial and the jury found in favor of 
Bollea.118 
                                                     
111. See Madigan, Jury Tacks on $25 Million, supra note 9. Note that the damages awarded may 
not have been attributable solely to the public disclosure claim, because other claims including an 
intrusion upon seclusion claim, were submitted to the jury. Jury Instructions, Bollea v. Gawker Media, 
LLC, No. 12012447CI-001 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 17, 2016), 
https://www.scribd.com/doc/305234461/Hulk-Hogan-vs-Gawker-civil-trial-jury-instructions 
[https://perma.cc/JPU9-EJX9]. 
112. Sydney Ember, Gawker and Hulk Hogan Reach $31 Million Settlement, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/03/business/media/gawker-hulk-hogan-
settlement.html?_r=0 (last visited Dec. 13, 2018). Interestingly, Bollea’s lawsuit was funded by 
Silicon Valley magnate, Peter Thiel, who Gawker publicly outed as gay in 2007. Matt Drange, Peter 
Thiel’s War on Gawker: A Timeline, FORBES (June 21, 2016, 1:22 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/mattdrange/2016/06/21/peter-thiels-war-on-gawker-a-
timeline/#246c06e851c5 [https://perma.cc/3P5A-F6FH].  
113. Gawker Media, 129 So. 3d at 1200–01.  
114. Id. at 1200.  
115. Id. at 1201 n.5.  
116. Id. at 1201.  
117. Id. at 1201 n.5. 
118. Bollea v. Gawker Media, LLC, No. 12012447-CI-011, 2016 WL 1270387, at *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 
Jan. 28, 2016). 
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The size of the award to Bollea also highlights how the public 
disclosure tort operates unevenly. Even where non-privileged plaintiffs 
have prevailed in privacy-related suits, the awards they receive often pale 
in comparison to those of privilege. As point of contrast, while not strictly 
involving a public disclosure claim (and instead misappropriation of 
image and related causes of action), in Coton v. Televised Visual,119 
plaintiff was awarded roughly $129,000 where plaintiff alleged that the 
defendant was using a self-portrait photograph taken of the plaintiff when 
she was fourteen years old to market pornographic videos without 
plaintiff’s permission. The defendants in Coton did not even defend the 
claim and a default judgment was entered.120 Notably, this case, like 
Bollea’s, was brought in Florida under Florida law, and yet the plaintiff’s 
damages were much more limited than Bollea’s. 
Perhaps even more glaring, in Cotto v. City of Middletown,121 plaintiff, 
who was of Puerto Rican descent and mildly intellectually disabled, was 
awarded only $1,000 in nominal damages and $32,500 in punitive 
damages when he was subjected to a strip search of his genitals and 
buttocks in full view of vehicular traffic that slowed down to watch the 
search. And in a revenge porn case involving egregious facts where the 
defendant uploaded secretly recorded sexual videos of a Muslim female 
teenager to the internet, the plaintiff was awarded $200,000 in damages 
for public disclosure and $145,000 for intrusion upon seclusion.122 
Bollea’s case is not the only example of privileged, and famous, people 
faring relatively well in privacy-related suits. For example, the mother of 
murdered model and professional wrestler Nancy Benoit brought a right 
of publicity suit against the publishers of Hustler for publishing twenty-
year-old nude images of Nancy taken well before she was murdered by 
her husband, another professional wrestler named Chris Benoit. While the 
case involved the intellectual property right to publicity claim, as opposed 
to a public disclosure privacy claim, the court ruled that the photos were 
not newsworthy because they bore no relation to the newsworthy event—
Nancy’s tragic death.123 As the court reasoned, “someone’s notorious 
                                                     
119. 740 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1303 (M.D. Fla. 2010). Because this case did not strictly involve a 
public disclosure tort claim, it is not included in the systematic review or the case chart. 
120. Id.  
121. Cotto v. City of Middletown, 158 F. Supp. 3d 67, 75, 90 (D. Conn. 2016). Significantly, this 
award covered plaintiff’s invasion of privacy claim and other, related claims. In Walgreen Co. v. 
Hinchy, 21 N.E.3d 99, 113–14 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), involving a pharmacy disclosure of plaintiff’s 
pharmacy records to the plaintiff’s ex-boyfriend, the plaintiff was awarded $1.44 million in damages 
for invasion of privacy and related claims.  
122. Patel v. Hussain, 485 S.W.3d 153, 171–72 (Tex. App. 2016).  
123. Toffoloni v. LFB Publ’g Grp., LLC, 572 F.3d 1201, 1211 (11th Cir. 2009). 
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death [does not] constitute[] a carte blanche for the publication of any and 
all images of that person during his or her life. . . .”124 To be clear, I am 
not suggesting that the outcome in this case is wrong. Just the opposite—
it would be desirable if the court’s pragmatic analysis that takes into 
account the everyday expectations of privacy was emulated in cases not 
involving privileged members of society. 
In another case involving a high-profile celebrity, professional football 
player and New York Giant Jason Pierre-Paul brought a public disclosure 
lawsuit against ESPN and one of its reporters after the reporter tweeted 
images of Pierre-Paul’s medical records indicating that Pierre-Paul had to 
have a finger amputated.125 The tweet occurred on July 8, 2015 in the 
midst of preexisting reporting and widespread public discussion regarding 
Pierre-Paul’s involvement in a Fourth of July fireworks accident that 
injured his hand, requiring hospitalization.126 While Pierre-Paul 
acknowledged that the amputation of his finger was a matter of legitimate 
public concern, he argued that the image of the chart itself was not.127 The 
District Court agreed and denied ESPN’s motion to dismiss, concluding 
that disclosure of the image of the chart (as opposed to the fact of 
amputation itself), may have exceeded appropriate limits and not been a 
matter of public concern.128 In other words, here again, when the 
disclosure concerns information about a high-profile, privileged person 
and concerns information (a medical injury) that bears directly on why 
that person is in the public eye (their ability to play football), the court 
nevertheless seems to interpret the tort in favor of the privileged 
plaintiff.129 As Amy Gajda has observed, “there are cases suggesting a 
                                                     
124. Id. at 1210. For a contrasting decision involving a non-famous plaintiff in a public disclosure 
tort case, see Anderson v. Suiters, 499 F.3d 1228, 1236–37 (10th Cir. 2008) (affirming grant of 
summary judgment in favor of media defendants who published limited portions of video of plaintiff 
allegedly being raped while unconscious by her husband after plaintiff provided the tape to law 
enforcement on the condition that it not be shared, because the tape was relevant to the prosecution 
of plaintiff’s husband for sexual assault, including assault on other victims, and therefore 
newsworthy).  
125. Pierre-Paul v. ESPN, Inc., No. 1:16-cv-21156, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119597, at *2 (S.D. 
Fla. Aug. 29, 2016). Because this case was decided just outside the decade-long period used for the 
systematic review, it is not included in the case chart. 
126. Def. ESPN, Inc.’s Mot. to Dismiss, Pierre-Paul v. ESPN, Inc., No. 1:16-cv-21156 (S.D. Fla. 
Apr. 7, 2016) 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119597. 
127. Pierre-Paul, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119597, at *2–3.  
128. Id. at *3.  
129. The case settled for an undisclosed amount in February 2017. See Marissa Payne, Jason 
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stiffening resolve to draw a line on reporting on public officials . . . and 
public figures,” protecting their privacy notwithstanding their public 
status.130 
Similarly, in an older case outside of the last decade, actress Pamela 
Anderson Lee and Poison musician Bret Michaels successfully enjoined 
an adult entertainment distributor from publishing a sex tape of Anderson 
Lee and Michaels.131 The court interpreted the public disclosure tort in 
favor of the celebrities.132 For example, the court rejected defendant’s 
arguments that because Anderson Lee had professionally “appeared nude 
in magazines, movies and publicly distributed videotapes” and because a 
separate sex tape between her and her husband Tommy Lee had already 
been widely distributed, the sex tape between her and Michaels was no 
longer private.133 The court correctly concluded that just because your 
body is exposed in one context, different images of your body did not 
become forever available to the public. Likewise, the court rejected the 
defendant’s argument that because a 148-second portion of the tape had 
been published online, the right to privacy had been extinguished.134 So, 
once more, the public disclosure’s strictures are relaxed and interpreted in 
favor of a privileged set of plaintiffs.135 
                                                     
130. GAJDA, supra note 34, at 177. Sportscaster Erin Andrews also rightly prevailed in her privacy 
lawsuit against a stalker who videotaped her undressing in her hotel room and the owner of the hotel 
that permitted him to obtain the room next to hers. However, the Andrews verdict does not necessarily 
suggest that the public disclosure tort’s standards are being applied in a more favorable manner 
towards celebrities because there was no real dispute that the information about Andrews was 
obtained surreptitiously (in other words, the information was completely secret beforehand and not 
exposed to anyone) and the stalker posted the information online, widely disseminating it. See 
generally Verdict Form, Andrews v. West End Hotel Partners, LLC, No. 11C4831, 2016 WL 915534 
(Tenn. Cir. Ct. Mar. 8, 2016).  
131. Michaels v. Internet Entm’t Grp., Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823, 842 (C.D. Cal. 1998). 
132. Id. at 843. 
133. Id. at 840. 
134. Id. at 841; see also Benz v. Wash. Newspaper Publ’g Co., No. 05-1760, 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 71827, at *26 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 29, 2006) (in public disclosure suit by CNN producer, the fact 
that plaintiff producer’s contact information was publicly available elsewhere did not defeat her 
disclosure suit for further publication by defendant); Times Picayune Publ’g Corp. v. United States, 
37 F. Supp. 2d 472, 477 (E.D. La. 1999) (denying FOIA request for mugshot of the owner of the San 
Francisco Forty-Niners because, although his conviction was already public knowledge, that mere 
fact did not defeat his privacy interest in the mugshot).  
135. In subsequent proceedings in the Michaels case, the court granted summary judgment in favor 
of a separate defendant, Paramount, that had published small portions of the tape when reporting on 
the adult entertainment company’s impending release of the tape. Michaels v. Internet Entm’t Grp., 
Inc., No. 98-cv-0583 DDP, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20786, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 1998). The court 
again rejected the notion that because Lee’s sex life and body had been publicized previously, she 
was not entitled to privacy. Id. at *22–23. However, in evaluating the newsworthiness prong of the 
public disclosure tort, the court concluded that the news report at issue was not sufficiently intrusive 
to outweigh Paramount’s First Amendment interest in discussing the tape because the clips it showed 
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Given its origins in elite New England society,136 perhaps it is no great 
surprise that the public disclosure tort is being used to greater effect by 
people of privilege and celebrity. Privilege permeates our law and, as 
Anita Allen and Erin Mack have noted, privacy torts were “the brainchild 
of nineteenth-century men of privilege”—Warren and Brandeis.137 
According to Allen and Mack, “the privacy tort bears the unmistakable 
mark of an era of male hegemony.”138 Principally, as originally conceived, 
the tort was built off gendered notions of female modesty that suggested 
women were vulnerable and in need of protection.139 As Allen and Mack 
argued several decades ago, issues of gender—and I would add privilege 
more generally—have often been overlooked in discussions of privacy 
torts.140 Despite their misgivings about the sexist norms underlying the 
development of privacy tort law, Allen and Mack believe that privacy 
law—including privacy torts—have an important role to play in 
advancing women’s rights and provide examples of how privacy torts can 
be pursued to fight, for example, sexual harassment without relying on 
gendered claims of female virtue and modesty.141 
                                                     
“were brief and revealed little in the way of nudity or explicit sexual acts.” Id. at *28–29. Conversely, 
in the lawsuit by Pamela Anderson Lee and her husband Tommy Lee against Penthouse for 
publication of intimate still photographs of the couple, Penthouse was granted summary judgment 
because the photos at issue had been previously published in three other publications. Lee v. 
Penthouse Int’l, No. 96-cv-7069 SVW, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23893, at *18 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 
1997).  
136. See generally Amy Gajda, What If Samuel D. Warren Hadn’t Married a Senator’s Daughter?: 
Uncovering the Press Coverage that Led to “The Right to Privacy”, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 35 
(suggesting that press coverage of Samuel Warren’s wedding to a senator’s daughter contributed to 
his interest in privacy protections); Charles E. Colman, About Ned, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 128 (2016) 
(carefully documenting that Samuel Warren may have been motivated by a desire to protect the 
privacy of his gay brother, Ned). 
137. Allen & Mack, supra note 71, at 441; see also id. at 456 (“[T]he Warren and Brandeis article 
was a lofty defense of values of affluence and gentility.”).  
138. Id. at 442.  
139. Id. at 453 (“[W]omen were deemed to be creatures of special modesty.”); see also Barbas, 
supra note 51, at 187–88 (noting that privacy tort cases from the early twentieth century reflected that 
and “codes of public performance were highly gendered” and that “unauthorized public display of 
women’s photographs” was deemed “particularly reprehensible [by courts]”); cf. CITRON, supra 
note 17, at 146 (“[S]ociety has a poor track record addressing harms primarily suffered by women 
and girls.”).  
140. Allen & Mack, supra note 71, at 469 (“Privacy tort scholars have consistently overlooked 
concern about women’s privacy as a force in the development of the privacy tort.”). Certainly, more 
recently, Danielle Keats Citron and Mary Anne Franks have been doing an incredible job of filling 
that gap, advocating that tort law can be used to combat revenge pornography, an act that often 
involves the online publication of women’s intimate photographs without their consent. See, e.g., 
Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
345, 357–59 (2014) (arguing that privacy torts are a potentially viable but insufficient means of 
combatting nonconsensual pornography).  
141. Allen & Mack, supra note 71, at 477.  
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But is it possible to limit the degree to which privilege colors the 
substantive application of privacy tort law, and tort law more broadly? 
The next Part explores whether evidence of disparate treatment and/or 
disparate impact in the application of tort law provides an impetus for the 
injection of constitutional equality principles into the substance of 
common law. 
III. INJECTING EQUALITY INTO THE COMMON LAW 
One of the major payoffs or implications for detailing the disparate 
application and impact of the current blackletter law on marginalized 
communities is that it provides evidence for importing constitutional 
equality principles into the common law doctrine. If the Constitution, 
namely the First Amendment, applies to the common law and limits how 
courts interpret and shape the substance of private tort law because the 
common law is a form of state action, then other provisions of the 
Constitution ought to also apply to that state action. This Part highlights 
how common law could be susceptible to influence from equal protection 
disparate treatment and impact doctrine, justifying (and arguably 
necessitating) modification of the substance and application of tort law. 
Equality principles can make the common law more sensitive to social 
context and the reality that many people may still be impacted by limited 
disclosures and find it nearly impossible to keep information totally secret 
ex ante. This Part first analyzes existing doctrine and scholarship finding 
state action in the creation and enforcement of the common law and shows 
how that doctrine suggests that tort law should also be guided by equal 
protection principles. It then demonstrates how those equality principles 
could alter tort privacy doctrine to benefit marginalized people. 
A. The Constitution and the Common Law 
Both scholarship and U.S. Supreme Court doctrine analyzing when 
state action (and therefore the Constitution) is implicated by the 
substantive application of common law have focused largely on the First 
Amendment.142 This narrow focus is unwarranted and unmoored from any 
textual foundation.143 Based on existing jurisprudence governing the state 
                                                     
142. Colby, supra note 5, at 358 nn.7 & 9 (2016) (observing that “the imposition of constitutional 
limits on the substantive content of a particular branch of tort law” is a “much more narrow 
phenomenon,” but documenting the use of constitutional principles to limit the imposition of punitive 
damages across a range of torts).  
143. Frank I. Michelman, The Bill of Rights, the Common Law, and the Freedom-Friendly State, 
58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 401, 404 (2003) (observing that New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 
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action doctrine, the contours of tort law ought to also be guided by other 
constitutional provisions, such as the equality and liberty principles of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
The delineations of the so-called “state action” doctrine have long been 
murky, and both the U.S. Supreme Court and scholars have struggled to 
create bright lines separating state action from purely private action.144 
Generally speaking, the Court has found state action notwithstanding the 
presence of private action when there is so-called entanglement—that is, 
where “the government affirmatively authorizes, encourages, or facilitates 
private conduct that violates the Constitution.”145 
In one of the earliest decisions addressing the scope of state action, 
Shelley v. Kraemer,146 the U.S. Supreme Court held that judicial 
enforcement of a racially restrictive housing covenant (a form of 
contract), whereby residents of a neighborhood agreed to only sell their 
property to white people, implicated state action.147 Therefore, the 
Constitution applied, and the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibitions on 
racial discrimination prevented the court from enforcing the 
discriminatory contract.148 
But, as may seem obvious, if judicial enforcement of a contract were 
always sufficient to constitute state action, the Constitution would apply 
to all attempts at private ordering, including all contract law. As Erwin 
                                                     
(1964), which used the First Amendment to limit the scope of a defamation tort, “does throw the doors 
open, and there is no way logically—conceptually—to push them shut”).  
144. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 535 (5th ed. 2015) 
(“Cases concerning [state action] exceptions have been called a ‘conceptual disaster area’ and even 
the Supreme Court has admitted that the cases deciding when private action might be deemed that of 
the state have not been a model of consistency.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Martha Minow, 
Alternative to State Action in the Era of Privatization, Mandatory Arbitration, and the Internet: 
Directing Law to Serve Human Needs, 52 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 145, 145 (2017) (observing that 
the state action doctrine is “notoriously confusing, if not incoherent”); cf. Michael C. Dorf, Incidental 
Burdens and the Nature of Judicial Review, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE 97, 98 (2016) (noting that 
when something is a law, and therefore subject to constitutional restriction, is a difficult and 
undertheorized question). 
145. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 144, at 527. State action may be found in other circumstances as 
well, such if a private entity is fulfilling a traditional public function. See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 
326 U.S. 501, 507–08 (1946) (holding that company-owned town was subject to the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments and could not criminally punish distribution of religious literature).  
146. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). 
147. Id. at 19 (“We have no doubt that there has been state action in these cases in the full and 
complete sense of the phrase. . . . It is clear that but for the active intervention of the state courts, 
supported by the full panoply of state power, petitioners would have been free to occupy the properties 
in question without restraint.”).  
148. Id. at 20.  
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Chemerinsky has explained, “[t]he Court, of course, never has taken 
Shelley this far, but nor has it articulated any clear limiting principles.”149 
1. The First Amendment’s Application to the Substance of Torts 
Instead, at least in the tort context (as opposed to contract or property 
law),150 the Court has suggested, post-Shelley, that the Constitution 
applies to tort law, not just because courts are called upon to enforce tort 
law, but also because judges create the common law—they create the rule 
of decision.151 For example, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,152 the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that a civil libel action brought under Alabama law 
was subject to constitutional restraints imposed by the First 
Amendment.153 The Court concluded that “[a]lthough this is a civil 
lawsuit between private parties, the Alabama courts have applied a state 
rule of law which petitioners claim to impose invalid restrictions on their 
constitutional freedoms of speech and press.”154 The Court elaborated, 
“[i]t matters not that that law has been applied in a civil action and that it 
is common law only, though supplemented by statute. The test is not the 
form in which state power has been applied but, whatever the form, 
                                                     
149. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 144, at 553; see also Robert E. Riggs, Constitutionalizing Punitive 
Damages: The Limits of Due Process, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 859, 898, 917 (1991) (suggesting that if the 
Due Process Clause limits punitive damages in civil suits, then it has the potential, if taken to its 
logical conclusion, to change “the whole face of tort law,” and arguing that constitutionalization of 
damages law would be a “clumsy, inappropriate way to achieve” reform).  
150. See, e.g., Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 567 (1972) (finding no state action where 
privately-owned shopping center prohibited distribution of handbills on its property); Hudgens v. 
NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 521 (1976) (holding that property owner’s exercise of right of exclusion in 
private shopping center did not implicate First Amendment).  
151. Given that judicially created canons of construction dictate how private contracts are to be 
interpreted, and therefore that courts do play a sizeable role in creating contract law, query whether 
the distinction between tort law and contract law for purposes of the state action doctrine is entirely 
consistent. See Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free Speech and Civil Liability, 109 
COLUM. L. REV. 1650, 1655–56 (2009) (observing that there is a “significant contradiction at the heart 
of First Amendment Law” because “when private parties sue in tort to remedy injuries resulting from 
speech, the First Amendment unquestionably provides robust protection” but that “when private 
parties use contract or property law to restrict speech, the First Amendment provides little to no 
scrutiny”); cf. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 671–72 (1991) (holding that First 
Amendment applied and state action was present where promissory estoppel law imposed liability on 
a newspaper who failed to keep confidentiality pledge to plaintiff, but because law was one of general 
applicability that did not impose special obligation and parties themselves determined the scope of 
their obligations through their promises, no violation of the First Amendment freedom of the press 
occurred). Interestingly, while the Court found state action in a promissory estoppel case, it has not 
been relied upon by the Court to inform state action analysis since.  
152. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
153. Id. at 265. 
154. Id. 
16 - Skinner-Thompson (3).docx (Do Not Delete) 1/6/2019  12:45 PM 
2018] PRIVACY’S DOUBLE STANDARDS 2083 
 
whether such power has in fact been exercised.”155 Thus, the Court 
reasoned that judge-made law that was judicially enforced was subject to 
constitutional limits and that, in order for a public official to bring a 
defamation claim consistent with the First Amendment, the official must 
show that the defendant acted with actual malice.156 
The U.S. Supreme Court has reaffirmed the First Amendment’s ability 
to “reshape the common-law landscape” of defamation law on multiple 
occasions.157 For example, in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Heppes,158 
the Court recognized that, while private tort suits were quite different than 
laws or rules passed by the legislature, the First Amendment still applied 
to a defamation suit.159 The Court noted that “[i]t is not immediately 
apparent from the text of the First Amendment, which by its terms applies 
only to governmental action, that [such limitations] should obtain here: a 
suit by a private party is obviously quite different from the government’s 
direct enforcement of its own laws.”160 Nevertheless, the Court reasoned 
that defamation suits could unconstitutionally chill expression if the 
plaintiff—even if a mere private figure themselves—did not bear the 
burden of proving that a statement regarding a matter of public concern 
was false.161 
And, in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co.,162 the Court held that the 
First Amendment’s protections for free speech and association extended 
to invalidate an attempt to impose tort liability for malicious interference 
with a business against civil rights activists who peacefully boycotted 
                                                     
155. Id.; see also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982) (describing two part test 
whereby for conduct to be considered state action the “right or privilege” at issue must be “created by 
the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State” and the party enforcing the law “must be a 
person who may fairly be said to be a state actor”); Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 
(1999) (also invoking two-part test).  
156. New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 283. Similarly, while it involved a statutory cause of action, 
in Time, Inc. v. Hill, the Court held that the First Amendment required that a jury be instructed they 
could impose liability for a false light invasion of privacy claim centered on matters of public interest 
only where there was proof that the defendant published the information with knowledge of its falsity 
or with reckless disregard of the truth. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387–88, 394–97 (1967); see 
also CITRON, supra note 17, at 207 (“Generally speaking, the First Amendment rules for tort remedies 
and criminal prosecutions are the same.”).  
157. Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775 (1986); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, 
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974) (applying the First Amendment to defamation tort law).  
158. 475 U.S. 767 (1986).  
159. Id. at 777. 
160. Id.  
161. Id. 
162. 458 U.S. 886 (1982). 
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segregated businesses in Mississippi.163 Relying on New York Times Co., 
the Court held that “[a]lthough this is a civil lawsuit between private 
parties, the application of state rules of law by the Mississippi state courts 
in a manner alleged to restrict First Amendment freedoms constitutes 
‘state action’ under the Fourteenth Amendment.”164 
The Court’s application of First Amendment law to tort law has also 
been extended to shape the substance of privacy torts.165 Most 
prominently, in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, the Court held that it 
would be inconsistent with the First Amendment for the states to enforce 
the public disclosure tort when it would sanction “the publication of 
truthful information contained in official court records open to public 
inspection.”166 Put differently, the complete secrecy requirement (part of 
the secrecy double standard) is, itself, a product of the First Amendment’s 
application to the substance of privacy torts. At this point, it seems taken 
for granted by the Court and scholars that the First Amendment applies to 
shape the substance of common law speech torts, such as defamation and 
privacy torts.167 
                                                     
163. Id. at 933–34. 
164. Id. at 916 n.51. The Court has also applied the First Amendment to the substance of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 459–60 (2011) (finding that 
First Amendment prevented imposition of liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress and 
intrusion upon seclusion against Westboro Baptist Church members who protested funeral of fallen 
soldier); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56–57 (1988) (finding Hustler to be protected 
from intentional infliction of emotional distress suit by First Amendment for its parody of Jerry 
Falwell).  
165. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting Truthful Speech: Narrowing the Tort of Public Disclosure 
of Private Facts, 11 CHAP. L. REV. 423, 426–30 (2008) (describing the First Amendment limitations 
on privacy torts, but suggesting that the method for determining whether the information is of 
legitimate public concern remains unclear).  
166. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975); see also Florida Star v. B.J.F., 
491 U.S. 524, 532 (1989) (holding that the imposition of civil liability for publication of rape victim’s 
name that had previously been contained in public police report was inconsistent with the First 
Amendment); cf. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 535 (2001) (holding that imposition of civil 
liability on media outlet that lawfully obtained information of public concern, even though the 
information had been unlawfully obtained by someone else initially, was inconsistent with First 
Amendment). 
167. Solove & Richards, Rethinking Free Speech, supra note 151, at 1651–52 (noting that “the 
well-settled rule is that the First Amendment provides full protection” for tort “harms caused by 
speech”). But see Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Truth, 41 CASE. W. RES. L. REV. 745, 753 (1991) 
(“It is not inherently inconsistent with the first amendment to create liability for disseminating truth.”). 
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2. Other Constitutional Provisions’ Application to Civil Action 
Procedures 
At the same time, the Court has also suggested that the First 
Amendment is not the only constitutional provision that applies to private 
action entangled with government action. Nor would such a limitation be 
principled or textually grounded. But outside of the First Amendment 
context, the application of constitutional principles to tort actions has 
centered more on the procedures or remedial aspects of litigating a 
particular civil action, rather than on the elements of the cause of action 
itself. 
For example, in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.,168 the U.S. 
Supreme Court considered whether the equal protection guarantees of the 
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause prevented a defendant in a civil 
negligence suit from using its preemptory challenges to exclude jurors on 
account of their race.169 The Court first observed that the “Constitution’s 
protections of individual liberty and equal protection apply in general only 
to action by the government,” but concluded that constitutional 
prohibitions on racial discrimination did extend to a private party’s 
exercise of a peremptory challenge.170 According to the Court, because 
such challenges were created by statute and because without overt 
participation of the courts in the peremptory challenge system, that system 
would not exist at all, state action was present and the Constitution 
adhered.171 
Similarly, in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,172 the Court held that where 
state law created a legal right to prejudgment attachment of a defendant’s 
                                                     
168. 500 U.S. 614 (1991). 
169. Id. at 616. 
170. Id. at 619.  
171. Id. at 622. Relatedly, Senior District Judge Jack B. Weinstein of the Eastern District of New 
York has been at the vanguard of subjecting damages calculations that rely on race-based actuarial 
calculations to equal protection scrutiny. G.M.M. ex rel. Hernandez-Adams v. Kimpson, 116 F. Supp. 
3d 126, 159 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (holding that “ethnic characteristics of an injured person cannot be used 
to reduce damages” in a tort case); McMillan v. City of New York, 253 F.R.D. 247, 248 (E.D.N.Y. 
2008) (holding that “‘[r]acially’ based life expectancy and related data may not be utilized to find a 
reduced life expectancy for a claimant in computing damages based on predictions of life 
expectancy”); see also Martha Chamallas, Questioning the Use of Race-Specific and Gender-Specific 
Data in Tort Litigation: A Constitutional Argument, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 73, 105–07 (1994) (arguing 
that there is state action implicating equal protection when courts admit into evidence and rely on 
race-based and gender-based data in determining damages); Kimberly A. Yuracko & Ronen 
Avraham, Valuing Black Lives: A Constitutional Challenge to the Use of Race-Based Tables in 
Calculating Tort Damages, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 325 (2018).  
172. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).  
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property in a civil lawsuit, and where a state officer—a sheriff—affects 
that attachment, state action existed such that the statute authorizing the 
attachment could be challenged as violating the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
due process guarantees.173 
The U.S. Supreme Court has also relied on constitutional due process 
principles to limit the imposition of punitive damages in civil suits. For 
instance, in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,174 the Court relied on 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down an 
award of punitive damages that was 500 times the actual damage suffered 
by the plaintiff, who sued an automobile manufacturer for failing to 
disclose that the car he bought required minor repairs before being 
purchased as “new.”175 Likewise, in State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Co. v. Campbell,176 the Court again relied on the Due Process 
Clause to limit the punitive damages imposed on State Farm for fraud and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress arising out of its scheme to cap 
payouts on claims.177 Interestingly, when discussing the application of the 
Due Process Clause to punitive damages imposed in civil lawsuits, the 
Court seems not even to analyze or discuss whether state action is 
implicated.178 
As such, ample authorities suggest that the creation and enforcement 
of tort law implicates state action, and therefore the Constitution applies. 
As the above discussion highlights, the First Amendment has so far been 
the principal constitutional provision used to shape the substantive 
contours of tort law generally,179 and as to privacy tort law it has been 
                                                     
173. Id. at 940–41. But see Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 53 (1999) (holding that 
mere state creation of a remedy is insufficient to attribute action of private actor to the state).  
174. 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
175. Id. at 582–83.  
176. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).  
177. Id. at 415, 429.  
178. See generally Phillips Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007) (applying due process 
limitations on punitive damages awarded in negligence suit without analysis of whether state action 
exists). Perhaps paradoxically, while federal due process protections have been successfully used to 
limit the size of punitive damages, state constitutional provisions have been used to challenge 
legislative “tort reform” efforts to ex ante limit punitive damages, pain and suffering damages, and 
other forms of liability. See John Fabian Witt, The Long History of State Constitutions and American 
Tort Law, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 1159, 1165 (2005) (documenting state constitutional challenges to tort 
reform legislation).  
179. That said, as Mark Geistfeld has pointed out, although due process principles have so far 
largely been applied only to limit punitive damages or other procedural aspects of litigation (as 
opposed to shape the substantive requirements of a particular tort), to the extent those decisions have 
relied on notions of fairness and fair notice, there is the potential for due process to also shape the 
substantive rules of tort liability by, for example, requiring that the rule of liability not be vague. Mark 
Geistfeld, Constitutional Tort Reform, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1093, 1119 (2005).  
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more or less the exclusive constitutional provision invoked.180 But as the 
above cases also make clear, nothing forecloses application of other 
constitutional provisions—such as the guarantees of equal protection—to 
tort law. Indeed, both Leesville Concrete Co. and Edmondson Oil Co., 
centered on the application of equal protection and due process 
protections to the procedures (use of peremptory challenges and 
attachment, respectively) used to enforce civil lawsuits, including, in the 
case of Leesville, a common law tort lawsuit. Integrating these two strands 
of authority (First Amendment application to substance of tort with equal 
protection/due process application to procedures surrounding tort suits) 
indicates what has been largely overlooked—equal protection principles 
could also influence the substance of tort law. 
3. Lessons from State Constitutions 
Significantly, great potential also exists for the equality guarantees of 
state constitutions to influence the substance of privacy torts.181 
Supplementing the protections of the federal Constitution, which serve as 
a floor with regard to individual rights states must respect,182 many state 
constitutions contain their own equality provisions. Not infrequently, 
these provisions are interpreted to provide more expansive and robust 
protections than their federal counterpart. 
State equal protection clauses are more expansive in at least two senses 
relevant here. First, they are sometimes interpreted to provide protections 
for classes not afforded protection under the federal Constitution. For 
instance, early advances toward the recognition of same-sex relationships 
were first recognized under state equality guarantees.183 Second, they 
                                                     
180. In his wonderful analysis of First Amendment limits on tort law, David Anderson has 
documented some of the peculiarities that come with applying the Constitution to the common law. 
In particular, it requires the court to both justify the state interest behind the tort law regulation 
(normally, when a statute is challenged, the state government defends the law) and, at the same time, 
pass on the legitimacy of the law. Anderson, supra note 24, at 770. Anderson has also documented 
how in cases involving the application of the Constitution to tort law, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
acted with a freer hand in proscribing solutions or remedies, whereas with statutes, the Court generally 
lets the legislature recraft the statute. Id. at 787.  
181. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 1; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11; VT. CONST. art. I. 
182. See, e.g., State v. Morales, 657 A.2d 585, 590 (Conn. 1995) (“It is beyond debate that ‘federal 
constitutional and statutory law establishes a minimum national standard for the exercise of individual 
rights and does not inhibit state governments from affording higher levels of protection for such 
rights.’” (quoting State v. Barton, 594 A.2d 917, 927 (Conn. 1991))).  
183. See, e.g., Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 481 (Conn. 2008) (finding 
Connecticut’s ban on same-sex marriage violated equal protection provisions of state constitution); 
Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 904 (Iowa 2009) (finding Iowa’s “equal protection clause requires 
more than has been offered to justify the continued existence of the same-sex marriage ban under the 
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often explicitly apply not just to state action, but also apply to limit 
discrimination by private actors.184 As one example, New York’s equal 
protection clause provides that “[n]o person shall be denied the equal 
protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof,” which 
tracks the federal corollary, but then it goes on to stipulate that “[n]o 
person shall, because of race, color, creed or religion, be subjected to any 
discrimination in his or her civil rights by any person or by any firm, 
corporation, or institution, or by the state or any agency or subdivision of 
the state.”185 
But in addition to instances where state constitutions directly permit 
constitutional causes of action against private actors, there is also 
evidence that state constitutional provisions indirectly influence the 
substance of common law causes of actions. Common law torts are, after 
all, a creature of state law.186 And, as Helen Hershkoff has explained, even 
though state constitutions do not “explicitly subject common law decision 
making to state constitutional . . . regulation,”187 there is non-trivial 
practice of state courts permitting state constitutional norms to influence 
the common law, thereby indirectly applying constitutional rules to 
private parties.188 Hershkoff isolates several examples of how 
constitutional values are infused into the common law through “private 
law portals.”189 Of particular pertinence here, Hershkoff points to 
examples where state courts have relied on constitutional equality 
provisions to hold private employers accountable for employment 
                                                     
statute”); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948–49 (Mass. 2003) (excluding same-
sex couples from the right to civil marriage is incompatible with “equality under law”).  
184. Helen Hershkoff, State Common Law and the Dual Enforcement of Constitutional Norms, in 
NEW FRONTIERS OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: DUAL ENFORCEMENT OF NORMS 151, 151 (James 
A. Gardner & Jim Rossi eds., 2010) (“State courts are not required to apply the federal state action 
doctrine; moreover, not all state constitutions contain a state action limitation.”); Minow, supra 
note 144, at 165 (suggesting that state constitutional law, which in certain states extends to private 
action, may be a way to achieve the realization of constitutional values without having to satisfy the 
federal state action requirements).  
185. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11. 
186. Colby, supra note 5, at 357 (“Tort law is, generally speaking, state law.”).  
187. Helen Hershkoff, “Just Words”: Common Law and the Enforcement of State Constitutional 
Social and Economic Rights, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1521, 1525, 1528 (2010). 
188. Hershkoff, supra note 184, at 152–53 (explaining that “[s]tate courts—more explicitly than 
federal courts—draw from diverse sources of authority in their common law decision making” and 
documenting how “state courts in a surprising range of cases effectively resolve private disputes in 
light of constitutional norms although these norms do not always give rise to a direct cause of action 
in private relations”).  
189. Id. at 152. 
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discrimination, even where those employers were exempt from state 
statutory antidiscrimination provisions.190 
Interestingly, while the federal jurisprudence discussed above 
illustrates that the First Amendment has often been used to limit plaintiffs’ 
ability to recover damages for defamation or privacy torts after state action 
is determined to attach to the enforcement of the tort, at other times state 
courts have used free speech values to justify modifying the substance of 
the common law without a finding of state action. In other words, rather 
than reaching an ultimate constitutional issue after determining that state 
action exists in tort law, First Amendment values are used to modify the 
substance of common law even without a finding of state action. For 
example, in construing the scope of a shopping mall owner’s property 
right to eject guests who are gathering petition signatures, the Oregon 
Supreme Court decided on a “subconstitutional level” that the public 
interest in protecting political speech, one of “society’s most precious 
rights,” limited the shopping mall owner’s entitlement to equitable 
relief.191 This decision was reached notwithstanding U.S. Supreme Court 
law concluding that shopping malls are private property and therefore the 
First Amendment does not directly apply to them and their efforts to eject 
invitees.192 
As such, there is reason to believe that both state and federal 
constitutional equality provisions could influence the substantive 
direction of privacy tort law, with this Article’s critical analysis of 
prevailing federal state action doctrine exposing how the federal 
Constitution, much like state constitutions, could apply to the common 
law. Having doctrinally justified the link between constitutional equality 
principles and tort law, in the following subsection, I analyze how federal 
                                                     
190. Id. at 157–58 (discussing Roberts v. Dudley, 140 Wash. 2d 58, 77–78, 993 P.2d 901, 911 
(2000), where the Washington State Supreme Court held that the public policy against pregnancy 
discrimination was enforceable through common law wrongful discharge tort, with the concurrence 
relying explicitly on the constitutional guarantee of sex equality rights); see also Phillips v. St. Mary 
Reg’l Med. Ctr., 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 770, 778–81 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002) (relying on the constitutional 
prohibition on sex and race discrimination as evidence of public policy supporting a wrongful 
termination claim wherein a religious employer exempt from statutory provisions allegedly retaliated 
against a plaintiff based on his complaint of race and sex discrimination).  
191. Lloyd Corp. v. Whiffen, 773 P.2d 1294, 1297, 1299 (Or. 1989). But see Pruneyard Shopping 
Ctr. v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980) (concluding that, under California’s free speech clause, 
students gathering signatures for a petition could not be ejected from privately-owned shopping mall). 
192. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520–21 (1980). Perhaps even more provocative than these 
more mainstream examples of the integration of constitutional law into the common law, in 
subsequent work Hershkoff argues that even the limited positive constitutional rights provided in 
some state constitutions (for example, a right to education) should influence the direction of the 
common law. Hershkoff, supra note 187, at 1528.  
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equal protection principles could be used to shape the substance of 
privacy tort law and remedy the problems of the secrecy double standard’s 
disparate impact and application identified in Parts I and II. 
B. Injecting Equality into Privacy Law 
To determine how constitutional equality principles could influence the 
substance of privacy torts, it is necessary to understand what the 
Constitution does and does not require in terms of equality. The Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State 
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws.”193 The Fifth Amendment’s due process guarantee,194 while not 
explicitly containing an equal protection promise, has been interpreted to 
apply equal protection principles to the federal government.195 These 
precepts regulate and limit government discrimination based on certain 
classifications. Pursuant to longstanding U.S. Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, the Equal Protection Clause requires race-based 
classifications to satisfy strict scrutiny196 and sex-based classifications to 
satisfy intermediate scrutiny.197 While the Court has not explicitly held 
that classifications based on sexual orientation are subject to either strict 
or intermediate scrutiny, in recent years the Court has rigorously analyzed 
and overturned both federal and state laws that limited the ability of 
                                                     
193. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
194. Id. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law . . . .”). 
195. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499–500 (1954) (recognizing that while the Fifth 
Amendment does not contain an equal protection clause, the guarantee of due process includes a 
guarantee of equal protection, and concluding that it would be “unthinkable” that the Constitution 
would apply lesser duties of equality on the federal government than the states); see also 
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 144, at 697 (“It is now well settled that the requirements of equal 
protection are the same whether the challenge is to the federal government under the Fifth Amendment 
or to state and local actions under the Fourteenth Amendment.”).   
196. Strict scrutiny requires that the classification or discrimination is necessary to achieve a 
compelling government interest. See, e.g., Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984) (applying 
strict scrutiny where a court divested a divorced parent of custody of their child because the parent’s 
new spouse was a different race); cf. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 
(1938) (suggesting that discrimination against “discrete and insular minorities” may require “more 
searching judicial inquiry”).  
197. Intermediate scrutiny requires that the classification be substantially related to an important 
government purpose. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (requiring 
Virginia’s differential treatment of men and women be justified by “important governmental 
objectives” and that the means employed be “substantially related” to achieving those objectives); 
Scott Skinner-Thompson et al., Marriage, Abortion, and Coming Out, 116 COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 
126, 148 (2016) (explaining that constitutional protections for reproductive freedom are rooted, in 
part, in equality principles).  
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people to marry those of the same sex.198 Other classifications, including 
disability and economic class, are subject to rational basis review.199 
Generally speaking, the existence of a suspect classification exists 
where (1) the law facially draws a distinction based on a protected 
characteristic, or (2) the law is facially neutral but has a discriminatory 
impact on members of a protected class AND the law was motivated by a 
discriminatory purpose.200 
In addition to protecting against discrimination based on a particular 
demographic characteristic, the Equal Protection Clause also guards 
against so-called “class of one” discrimination even where “the plaintiff 
did not allege membership in a class or group.”201 According to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, when a person is subject to arbitrary government 
treatment and treated differently from others similarly situated, that 
person may bring a class-of-one equal protection claim, reviewed under 
the rational basis standard.202 
As Part I highlights, blackletter public disclosure tort law does not, on 
its face, draw any distinctions based on gender, race, sexual orientation, 
or any other protected class. However, as suggested by the survey of 
public disclosure cases analyzed in Part II, the law is being applied in 
disparate and arbitrary ways and with disparate impacts. If courts 
interpreting privacy tort law are doing so in a way that treats similarly 
situated plaintiffs differently, is equal protection implicated? Separate and 
apart from any disparate treatment of similarly situated individuals, does 
the disparate impact theory of discrimination offer a way to revise the 
public disclosure tort? Even if a formal equal protection claim could not 
be successfully brought, would the evidence of inequality provide courts 
a doctrinally-based reason or impetus to reshape the substantive 
requirements of the public disclosure tort? This subsection addresses these 
questions. 
First, I will address disparate treatment of similarly situated 
individuals. As noted, at first glance public disclosure tort law purports to 
                                                     
198. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2591 (2015) (striking down state bans on 
same-sex marriage as a violation of equal protection); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 775 
(2013) (declaring unconstitutional the Defense of Marriage Act’s requirement that the federal 
government refuse to recognize same-sex marriages granted by states); see also Scott Skinner-
Thompson, The First Queer Right, 116 MICH. L. REV. 881 (2018) (discussing the Obergefell and 
Windsor decisions and the limitations of equal protection jurisprudence as a frame for LGBTQ rights). 
199. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985) (subjecting classification 
based on mental disability only to rational basis review).  
200. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 144, at 698.  
201. Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). 
202. Id.  
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treat all plaintiffs the same (that is, it is not facially discriminatory). 
However, in practice there is evidence that similarly situated plaintiffs are 
treated differently under the law, as outlined in Part II.203 Under prevailing 
jurisprudence, if the law or state officials disparately treat individuals who 
are similarly situated in relevant respects other than in a protected 
characteristic (race, gender, etc.), an inference of discrimination is raised 
implicating constitutional equal protection guarantees.204 As explained by 
Giovanna Shay in her thorough analysis of the “similarly situated” test, in 
equal protection “cases that do not involve express categorizations,” 
plaintiffs “must first demonstrate that other ‘similarly situated’ 
individuals were treated differently.”205 
Importantly, in cases such as Yick Wo v. Hopkins,206 the Court has 
emphasized that when a facially neutral law is applied or enforced in a 
way that causes disparate results, the law may violate equal protection 
guarantees.207 In Yick Wo, the Court addressed whether equal protection 
had been violated when a licensing regime for laundries, while facially 
neutral, had been applied so as to deny permission to more than 200 
people of Chinese ancestry, but was granted to eighty non-Chinese 
people.208 The Court held that equal protection was violated because  
[W]hatever may have been the intent of the ordinances as 
adopted, they are applied by the public authorities charged with 
their administration, and thus representing the State itself, with a 
mind so unequal and oppressive as to amount to a practical denial 
by the State of that equal protection of the laws.209 
Separate and apart from any disparate treatment that might exist, if a 
law both has a disparate impact on a particular racial group or gender and 
                                                     
203. Supra Part II. 
204. See, e.g., Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240–41 (2005) (holding that defendant may rely 
on “all relevant circumstances” to raise inference of discrimination in jury selection, including “side-
by-side” comparisons of how venire members were treated); Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc., v. 
Napolitano, 648 F.3d 365, 379 (6th Cir. 2011) (“To state an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must 
adequately plead that the government treated the plaintiff disparately as compared to similarly situated 
persons and that such disparate treatment either burdens a fundamental right, targets a suspect class, 
or has no rational basis.” (internal quotations omitted) (citing Club Italia Soccer & Sports Org., Inc. 
v. Charter Twp. Shelby, 470 F.3d 286, 299 (6th Cir. 2006))).  
205. Giovanna Shay, Similarly Situated, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 581, 587–88 (2011); see also 
United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (suggesting that “ordinary equal protection 
standards” involve comparing similarly situated individuals to determine whether discrimination 
occurred (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985))).  
206. 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
207. See id. at 373–74. 
208. See id. at 374. 
209. Id. at 373. 
16 - Skinner-Thompson (3).docx (Do Not Delete) 1/6/2019  12:45 PM 
2018] PRIVACY’S DOUBLE STANDARDS 2093 
 
is motivated by a discriminatory purpose, the law may be impermissible 
under federal constitutional law.210 That said, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
rarely found a disparate impact violation and has held that disparate 
impact without discriminatory purpose is not enough to subject the law to 
heightened scrutiny.211 Indeed, in the much-maligned212 case of 
McCleskey v. Kemp,213 the Court was confronted with strong empirical 
evidence that Georgia’s death penalty was being applied with a 
disproportionate impact on black individuals, but concluded that evidence 
was insufficient to overturn the death sentence of the individual petitioner 
because the evidence did not, in the Court’s view, necessarily suggest that 
any of the particular decisions in the case at hand were motivated by 
race.214 
Yet, the Court has never foreclosed disparate impact as a means of 
demonstrating an equal protection violation and has repeatedly 
acknowledged its theoretical viability.215 According to the Court, when 
the disparate impact is so severe that discriminatory purpose can be 
inferred, the dual impact and purpose requirements are, in effect, 
blurred.216 Put differently by the U.S. Supreme Court in Washington v. 
                                                     
210. See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) (concluding that an at-large voting system in 
county with large black population operated with a disparate impact excluding black elected officials 
and was motivated by a discriminatory purpose).   
211. Cf. City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found., 538 U.S. 188, 194–95 (2003) 
(reaffirming that proof of discriminatory purpose is required under the Equal Protection Clause); 
Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 484 (1982) (similar); Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. 
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) (same).  
212. See, e.g., Helen Norton, The Supreme Court’s Post-Racial Turn Towards a Zero-Sum 
Understanding of Equality, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 250–53 (2010) (explaining that attempts 
to remedy disparate impacts play a role in ensuring that people are treated based on merit, not on 
“unexamined yet entrenched . . . patterns of subordination,” and, therefore, disparate impact theory 
need not necessarily feed conservative fears that it will lead to rigid zero-sum, parceling out of 
opportunities, but instead optimizes social welfare at the same time that it results in anti-
subordination); Mario Barnes et al., A Post-Race Equal Protection?, 98 GEO. L.J. 967, 993 (2010) 
(documenting the narrowness of disparate impact theory under prevailing equal protection analysis).  
213. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
214. Id. at 293–96. 
215. Indeed, as Russell Robinson has highlighted, the Court sometimes does take a contextual 
approach to identifying and sussing out discrimination. But, as detailed by Robinson, the Court is 
itself unequal in doing so, favoring claims based on sexual orientation over claims based on race or 
gender. Russell Robinson, Unequal Protection, 68 STAN. L. REV. 151, 180–81 (2016). Moreover, in 
recent terms, the Court has continued to uphold the viability of disparate impact claims under certain 
statutory anti-discrimination protections. See, e.g., Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. The 
Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 576 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2521 (2015) (upholding validity of 
disparate impact theory under Fair Housing Act).  
216. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 345 (1960); cf. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 
135 S. Ct. at 2522–24. 
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Davis,217 “[d]isproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole 
touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination.”218 
For example, in a leading equal protection disparate impact case, 
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,219 the 
Court reaffirmed its earlier holding in Washington v. Davis that “official 
action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a 
racially disproportionate impact.”220 However, at the same time that it 
required evidence of discriminatory purpose, the Court also clarified that 
nothing required a plaintiff “to prove that the challenged action rested 
solely on racially discriminatory purposes.”221 As the Court reasoned, 
rarely could it be demonstrated that a governing body acted with a single 
concern or that a particular purpose was even the primary one.222 
Moreover, the Court emphasized that purpose could be gleaned from 
“circumstantial and direct evidence” and required a “sensitive inquiry.”223 
It described evidence of a disparate impact as “an important starting 
point” for determining the existence of an improper purpose.224 Indeed, 
the Court noted that where “a clear pattern, unexplainable on grounds 
other than race, emerges from the effect of the state action,” the 
“evidentiary inquiry is . . . relatively easy.”225 The Court has also 
explicitly stated that when the relevant pattern is “stark” then disparate 
impact may be “determinative” of discriminatory purpose.226 As the Court 
sensibly recognized in Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board,227 “[t]he 
impact of an official action is often probative of why the action was taken 
in the first place since people usually intend the natural consequences of 
                                                     
217. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
218. Id. at 242 (refusing to apply strict scrutiny to facially neutral employment test notwithstanding 
disproportionate impact).  
219. 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
220. Id. at 264–65. 
221. Id. at 265 (emphasis added).  
222. Id.  
223. Id. at 266; see also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93 (1986) (reiterating that circumstantial 
evidence, such as a disproportionate impact, may be relied on to demonstrate invidious intent in equal 
protection challenge to prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges).  
224. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266. 
225. Id.; see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (“It is also not infrequently true 
that the discriminatory impact . . . may for all practical purposes demonstrate unconstitutionality 
because in various circumstances the discrimination is very difficult to explain on nonracial 
grounds.”). 
226. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266.  
227. 520 U.S. 471 (1997). 
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their actions.”228 Moreover, certain states have interpreted their 
constitutional equality provisions as permitting disparate impact claims 
even without evidence of discriminatory purpose.229 
The U.S. Supreme Court has explained that leaving room for disparate 
impact as a means of proving discriminatory purpose is crucial because 
otherwise discriminatory laws could be “cloaked” in neutrality with the 
equality guarantees of the Constitution “manipulated out of existence.”230 
The importance of looking beyond apples-to-apples comparisons has also 
been emphasized by critical and feminist critiques of formal equality legal 
theories. They argue in favor of a “deeper substantive equality inquiry” 
because, even if you are able to find the occasional “like” case impacting 
a non-marginalized group member, the similarly-situated analysis may 
mask whether an injury more likely to be suffered by a marginalized group 
has been neglected by the law.231 
In addition to the guideposts offered by formal disparate treatment and 
impact claims, cases where the U.S. Supreme Court has subjected punitive 
damage awards to due process limitations evince the constitutional 
importance of treating like-cases alike. For example, in BMW of North 
America, Inc., discussed above, in determining whether an award of 
punitive damages implicated due process concerns, the Court emphasized 
the importance that like misconduct be treated alike232—this principle has 
clear implications for the substance of privacy tort law.233 Just as like 
defendants should be treated similarly in terms of the punitive damages 
imposed, so too should plaintiffs and defendants involved in public 
                                                     
228. Id. at 487 (applying the Arlington Heights framework in a section 5 Voting Rights Act case).  
229. See Linda J. Wharton, State Equal Rights Amendments Revisited: Evaluating Their 
Effectiveness in Advancing Protection Against Sex Discrimination, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 1201, 1257–58 
(2005) (discussing state law examples where discriminatory purpose was not required to bring a 
disparate impact claim).  
230. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 345 (1960) (quoting Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. R.R. 
Comm’n of Cal., 271 U.S. 583, 594 (1926) (quotations omitted) (an equal protection violation claim 
was stated where it was alleged that redrawn city boundaries removed all but four or five of a city’s 
400 black voters and did not remove a single white voter); cf. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 
228 (1985) (recognizing that “[p]roving the motivation behind official action is often a problematic 
[and difficult] undertaking”).  
231. CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 4, at 46.  
232. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 584 (1996) (comparing the size of the punitive 
damage award to statutory sanctions for similar conduct).  
233. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 428 (2003) (evaluating the 
“disparity between the punitive damages award and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in 
comparable cases” (internal quotations omitted) (quoting BMW of N. Am., 517 U.S. at 575)); cf. Phillip 
Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 353 (2007) (reiterating comparability requirement).  
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disclosure tort cases have a uniform set of legal standards imposed.234 
Indeed, while the BMW line of cases has been criticized because they 
employ concepts of equality in order to benefit the privileged (large 
corporate defendants subject to large punitive damage awards),235 the 
approach advocated here re-appropriates those cases for truly, 
substantively equitable purposes—helping ensure fair results for 
marginalized groups in civil privacy lawsuits (and potentially other 
contexts). 
Therefore, under either a disparate treatment or disparate impact 
theory, or based on due process principles of comparability,236 there is 
reason to believe that public disclosure tort doctrine currently operates in 
such a way that it implicates constitutional equality principles.237 As we 
saw, this Article’s survey of public disclosure tort law over the past decade 
indicates that the complete secrecy and widespread disclosure 
requirements are not applied consistently by courts or, at the very least, 
limit the availability of the tort to marginalized communities who live in 
conditions where their information is more difficult to keep private and/or 
where they share information as a form of bonding, identity exploration, 
or resistance. 
As such, to better comply with constitutional equality principles, the 
substance of privacy tort law must be relaxed so as to ensure that 
individuals in marginalized communities are able to bring claims on the 
                                                     
234. Cf. Colby, supra note 5, at 379 (discussing the potential for due process guarantees against 
“individualized unfairness” to play a role in policing civil damage awards, even awards for 
compensatory—as opposed to punitive—damages).  
235. See, e.g., Martha T. McCluskey, Constitutionalizing Class Inequality: Due Process in State 
Farm, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 1035, 1043–44 (2008) (explaining how the Court equates protection of upper-
class interests with fairness and equality in its due process punitive damages cases and polices use of 
discretion when used to impose severe damages, but lauds discretion in cases, like McCleskey, 
challenging sentencing disparities); Adam M. Gershowitz, Note, The Supreme Court’s Backwards 
Proportionality Jurisprudence: Comparing Judicial Review of Excessive Criminal Punishments and 
Excessive Punitive Damages Awards, 86 VA. L. REV. 1249 (2000) (documenting that, perversely, the 
U.S. Supreme Court seems more open to striking down punitive damages as disproportionate in 
comparison to striking down criminal punishments as disproportionate).  
236. It is also worth noting that the First Amendment itself, which as discussed is already applied 
to the substance of privacy torts, is closely linked with equality principles. For example, as Carlos 
Ball details, First Amendment speech protections often advance equality aims. The First Amendment 
served an important incubating function for the articulation of equality and privacy arguments in favor 
of LGBTQ individuals at the same time that it also created space for greater visibility of queer people 
in American society. See generally CARLOS A. BALL, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND LGBT EQUALITY: 
A CONTENTIOUS HISTORY (Harvard Univ. Press ed. 2017). 
237. Cf. Richard M. Re, “Equal Right to the Poor”, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1149 (2017) (arguing that 
the federal judicial oath requiring judges to “do equal right to the poor and to the rich” might empower 
judges to consider whether their decisions are sensitive to substantive economic equality).  
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same terms as privileged individuals.238 One clear way to do so would be 
through the relaxation of the “secrecy double standard,” which appears 
not to be rigorously enforced in cases involving privileged plaintiffs (e.g., 
Bollea, Pierre-Paul, Anderson Lee). Consistent with those cases, all 
plaintiffs should be able to bring public disclosure claims even if they 
have shared the information at issue (for example, their HIV status, sexual 
orientation, or intimate photographs) within certain confines.239 
Similarly, marginalized plaintiffs should be able to state a claim even 
if the defendant does not publicize to the world the information at issue. 
Recall the case involving the purportedly gay parishioner whose pastor 
allegedly informed the church that the plaintiff was gay, but the case was 
dismissed for insufficient publicity.240 The harm to the plaintiff in that 
case was no less real (and probably more so) than the harm to Bollea. But, 
of course, if a person is not a public persona their private information is 
not likely to be of interest to those outside their community, and therefore 
is likely not to be broadcast “widely” in the first instance. As such, for it 
to operate in such a way that the tort is still available to non-privileged 
members of society (who at least in theory are entitled to more privacy 
than privileged celebrities), it only makes sense for the widespread 
publicity requirement to be contextually applied so as to not require 
universal, worldwide publication in order to bring a claim.241 Moreover, 
it would seem that the extent of disclosure could be considered at the 
damages phase, rather than as a substantive requirement. 
This Article’s theory of equal protection privacy torts builds off the 
critical torts scholarship of Marta Chamallas and Jennifer Wriggins who 
                                                     
238. Cf. CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 4, at 46 (arguing that “courts in tort cases should be 
sensitive to context and should place a high priority on protecting plaintiffs’ sexual, reproductive, and 
intimate familial relationships against negligent injury, analogous to their protection as fundamental 
interests under the U.S. Constitution”). 
239. For models of such a contextual approach, see Peterson v. Moldofsky, No. 07-2603-EFM, 
2009 WL 3126229, at *5 (D. Kan. Sept. 29, 2009) (holding that defendant’s disclosure of intimate 
sexual photographs of plaintiff to only five people did not defeat plaintiff’s publication of privacy 
facts claim as a matter of law and, instead, whether the publication requirement had been satisfied 
should be determined by examining “the context of the communication—e.g., its medium and 
content”); M.G. v. Time Warner, Inc., 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 504, 511 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (distinguishing 
secrecy from privacy when determining whether the issue was already public and holding that 
“[i]nformation disclosed to a few people may remain private”); Multimedia WMAZ, Inc. v. Kubach, 
443 S.E.2d 491, 494 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that plaintiff could still bring a disclosure claim 
notwithstanding that he had shared his HIV positive status with family and friends). 
240. Bilbrey v. Myers, 91 So. 3d 887, 892 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012). 
241. Cf. NISSENBAUM, supra note 29, at 148–50 (emphasizing the importance of social context in 
determining whether a privacy norm has been implicated).  
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highlight the unequal impacts of certain precepts of tort law.242 As they 
explain, while “formal doctrine is neutral on its face and rights and 
liabilities are stated in universal terms, considerations of race and gender 
[and, I would add, privilege more broadly] most often work their way into 
tort law in complex, subtle ways.”243 In particular, Chamallas and 
Wriggins highlight how limitations on emotional damages, while 
seemingly facially neutral, were used to devalue harms suffered by 
women.244 That is, the law disfavors the type of claims or injuries that are 
more likely to be suffered by women.245 
This Article’s analysis unearths another context where tort law has 
operated unequally—privacy law. But in addition to embellishing 
Chamallas and Wriggins’ descriptive critique, by shining a light on how 
the Constitution has been unevenly applied to the substance of tort law 
with the First Amendment receiving near exclusive attention thus far, I 
chart a principled and doctrinally-based course for incorporating equality 
principles into common law doctrine through the Equal Protection 
Clause.246 That is, this Article connects the dots between Chamallas and 
Wriggins’ normative prescription “for a more thorough integration of civil 
rights and equality norms into the mainstream of torts” by foregrounding 
a constitutional basis for doing just that.247 
Additionally, this Article extends the critique offered by Danielle 
Citron who has powerfully argued that both criminal and tort law 
regulating internet behavior should be viewed through a civil rights lens 
and laws should be used to “protect the equality of opportunity in the 
information age.”248 As Citron explains, traditional civil remedies, such 
as tort law, must be supplemented by civil rights remedies because tort 
                                                     
242. See generally CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 4.  
243. Id. at 1. 
244. Id. at 2 (explaining that “certain injuries—often related to reproduction and motherhood—
have been socially constructed as ‘emotional,’ rather than ‘physical,’ with significant implications for 
the prospects of recovery”); id. at 36 (documenting that “[g]ender and race may have vanished from 
the face of tort law, but considerations of gender and race remained relevant to the recognition and 
valuation of injury”).  
245. Id. at 3; see also id. at 92 (“To be clear, the gender dynamic in these cases is not that of 
favoring individual male plaintiffs over individual female plaintiffs. Rather, gender disadvantage 
flows from disfavoring the type of claim that women plaintiffs are likely to bring [for example, tort 
claims related to reproductive injuries], thus placing them—and any male plaintiffs who bring similar 
claims—at a structural disadvantage.”).  
246. While undoubtedly suggesting important reforms, as Chamallas and Wriggins acknowledge, 
at times their suggestions that considerations of civil rights be imported into tort law are pitched at a 
relatively “higher level of generality.” Id. at 7. 
247. Id. at 34.  
248. CITRON, supra note 17, at 25.  
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law (as traditionally conceived), does “not respond to the stigmatization 
and humiliation endured when victims are targeted . . . due to their 
gender, race, national origin, or sexual orientation.”249 
By demonstrating that constitutional equality principles should (and 
do) implicate tort law, this Article offers a doctrinal foundation for 
incorporating civil rights principles directly into tort law, separate and 
apart from any statutory equality protections that may or may not be 
passed by legislative bodies. Again, as discussed more in Part IV, this is 
not necessarily to say that a privacy tort plaintiff will be able to 
successfully bring an equal protection challenge to the way the public 
disclosure tort is operating, given that the Equal Protection Clause only 
protects certain classes and because of the strictures of disparate impact 
theory—but the evidence of inequality coupled with the existence of state 
action nevertheless provides litigants and courts a constitutionally-
grounded basis for reforming the contours of current blackletter tort law. 
IV. DRAWBACKS TO THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF 
TORTS? 
While there is great potential for the constitutionalization of torts as a 
pathway for injecting equality and justice concerns into the substance of 
privacy tort law, and tort law more broadly, there are potential barriers to 
this approach in terms of doctrine and drawbacks should the approach be 
adopted. Here, I address some of those concerns. 
A. Barriers of Proof 
Even assuming there is a firm, doctrinally-sound basis for injecting 
constitutional equal protection principles into the substance of privacy 
torts because such torts implicate state action,250 meaningful hurdles must 
still be overcome in terms of demonstrating that a particular privacy tort 
is being applied unequally or operating with unequal results. To state a 
formal equal protection disparate treatment claim, a plaintiff would need 
to amass significant evidence that a particular state’s tort law was being 
applied differently to different protected classes of people.251 And 
gathering evidence to support a disparate impact claim and threading the 
                                                     
249. Id. at 126; cf. CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 4, at 188 (calling for the increase and 
acceleration of “civil rights principles and norms into tort law in a self-conscious effort to weave 
gender and race equality into basic tort law principles”). 
250. See supra section III.A.  
251. See supra section III.B. 
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narrow doctrinal needle of the U.S. Supreme Court’s disparate impact 
jurisprudence would be even more daunting. 
Indeed, as this Article’s modest descriptive results attest,252 locating 
evidence of disparate treatment/outcomes is a meaningful, resource-
intensive undertaking. Even with non-trivial resources, the data available 
remains limited. As barriers in access to justice prevent many people from 
bringing suits in the first instance,253 suits that are brought often settle,254 
and even those that go to jury verdicts may not be reported in standard 
research databases such as Lexis or Westlaw. As a result, the available 
data from trial court decisions on motions to dismiss, motions for 
summary judgment, and appeals is a small portion of the claims 
implicating a given tort. Moreover, demographic data regarding identity 
characteristics of plaintiffs and defendants may not even be mentioned in 
a given decision. Finally, the disparities that are uncovered may not run 
neatly along recognized suspect classifications, as highlighted by this 
Article’s comparison of famous, socially and economically privileged 
individuals to various kinds of marginalized individuals. 
The reality of these barriers provides an opportunity to reiterate exactly 
what I mean when I suggest that equal protection principles can, with 
doctrinal justification, be called upon by judges to alter the contours of 
tort law. I am not necessarily suggesting or envisioning formal equal 
protection challenges to the current operation of the public disclosure tort, 
but rather am suggesting that courts have a doctrinally justified basis for 
paying mind to equality concerns when shaping and applying the tort law, 
much like certain state courts have done with state constitutional law.255 
B. Federalism Concerns 
One may also be concerned that incorporating federal constitutional 
law as a substantive guidepost for state tort law would infringe on states’ 
ability to create their own law. This concern is real but overstated. 
                                                     
252. Supra Part II. 
253. Cf. Elizabeth L. MacDowell, Reimagining Access to Justice in the Poor People’s Courts, 22 
GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 473, 476–77 (2015) (collecting studies documenting differences in 
outcomes between represented and unrepresented people in different areas of the law); Lynsi Burton, 
King County Couple Awarded $8.9 Million Revenge Porn Verdict, SEATTLE P.I. (May 9, 2017, 6:20 
PM), http://www.seattlepi.com/local/crime/article/King-County-couple-awarded-8-9M-revenge-
porn-11133330.php (last visited Dec. 13, 2018) (documenting record verdict for non-celebrity in 
revenge porn lawsuit, where represented by major international law firm pro bono).  
254. Marc Galanter, The Hundred-Year Decline of Trials and the Thirty Years War, 57 STAN. L. 
REV. 1255, 1255 (2005) (discussing the decline of civil trials).  
255. See supra section III.A (discussing Helen Hershkoff’s work analyzing the injection of state 
constitutional norms into common law).  
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First, as important as states may be in their role as laboratories, it is an 
equally unassailable precept that federal constitutional law governs 
supreme.256 If courts are going to apply the First Amendment as a limit on 
state common law, courts must be consistent and consider other 
constitutional provisions. Moreover, to the extent that the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s equal protection guarantees are directly applicable to the 
states257—in contrast to the First Amendment and other provisions of the 
Bill of Rights that had to be selectively incorporated or applied to the 
states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment258—
there is, in some sense, a stronger textual basis for applying equal 
protection law to tort law than to the First Amendment. 
Second, as highlighted in the above discussion on the barriers of proof, 
inviting the incorporation of equality principles into the common law will 
not lead to a flood of challenges or dramatic reshaping of privacy torts.259 
Instead, it has the potential to influence the edges of the law, making it 
more equitable in its application, but poses no real risk of leading to the 
introduction of a federal general common law or the erosion of Erie 
Railroad v. Tompkins.260 
Third, in an integrated American economy, there remains equal 
opportunity for state tort law to disrupt federalism principles if such law 
is left unchecked by federal constitutional law. The litigation surrounding 
due process limits on punitive damages elucidates this point. If a particular 
state’s imposition of punitive damages is left unregulated by due process 
limitations, that state has potential to alter corporate behavior by imposing 
large damages on particular tortfeasors and, in effect, create a uniform, 
nationwide regulatory regime.261 This is particularly true with the 
                                                     
256. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . shall be 
the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”). 
257. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws.”).  
258. See Gitlow v. People of New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (applying the First Amendment’s 
speech protections, which by its terms only applies to “Congress,” to a state through the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).  
259. Supra section IV.A. 
260. 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (holding that there is no “federal general common law” and that the 
law to be applied in a suit in federal court on diversity jurisdiction shall be the governing state law). 
And, to some extent, the U.S. Supreme Court has already found other, indirect ways of influencing 
common law torts through, among other mechanisms, statutory preemption in certain fields. John C. 
P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Supreme Court’s Stealth Return to the Common Law of 
Torts, 65 DEPAUL L. REV. 433, 435 (2016) (outlining several mechanisms used by the Supreme Court 
to influence tort doctrine). 
261. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585 (1996) (overturning large punitive damage 
award imposed by Alabama court on BMW and noting that BMW’s “status as an active participant 
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expansion of specific personal jurisdiction.262 But using the Constitution 
as a shield to limit the scope of punitive damages permits states more 
practical latitude in creating different common law regulatory structures. 
In other words, depending on the context, constitutionalization can 
actually preserve different states’ interests. Opening tort law more broadly 
to constitutional influences does not mean that state interests will 
evaporate. 
C. Private Ordering 
Related to the federalism concern is a concern that subjecting the 
common law to constitutional influence might infringe on private ordering 
by, for example, subjecting contract law to constitutional scrutiny.263 
While that concern would ring true if, for example, contract law was 
subjected to intensive constitutional scrutiny, tort law is (in theory) 
already a product of the community as expressed through judicial 
lawmaking. Moreover, tort law is generally designed to regulate and step 
into disorder—when accidents occur and the unanticipated comes to 
fruition. Therefore, using constitutional law to make the default common 
law rules more equitable would not prevent parties from separately 
arranging their affairs. Of course, even if it did, addressing inequality and 
uneven bargaining power within contracting dynamics may not be the 
worst of outcomes.264 
D. A Shortsighted Solution? 
Finally, one could argue that subjecting the common law to 
constitutional policing is, in some respects, shortsighted and loses track 
of the fact that the Constitution generally, and the Bill of Rights itself, are 
fluid and political. Does constitutionalizing tort law now, when equality 
                                                     
in the national economy implicates the federal interest in preventing individual States from imposing 
undue burdens on interstate commerce . . . [as] each State has ample power to protect its own 
consumers, [but] none may use the punitive damages deterrent as a means of imposing its regulatory 
policies on the entire Nation”). 
262. See generally Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014) (detailing the history of personal 
jurisdiction jurisprudence and noting that specific personal jurisdiction has moved away from the 
strict territorial approach).  
263. Cf. Joseph Blocher & Darrell A.H. Miller, What Is Gun Control? Direct Burdens, Incidental 
Burdens, and the Boundaries of the Second Amendment, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 295, 343 (2016) 
(suggesting that courts should be cautious before applying the Second Amendment to attempts to 
privately order the use of guns).  
264. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965) 
(finding that a gross inequality of bargaining power can render a contract unconscionable).  
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protections are arguably near their historical zenith, risk subsequent 
contraction of common law’s egalitarian purpose should the prevailing 
interpretation of the Constitution also contract?265 
Maybe; but this view, itself, is somewhat ahistorical. As the discussion 
of equal protection doctrine in Part III suggests, while equality norms 
pervade constitutional discourse, to successfully bring an equal protection 
challenge is difficult—that is, in some ways current equal protection 
doctrine is quite narrow, quite conservative. Consequently, the risk that 
constitutionalization of tort law might lead to restrictions in tort law’s 
ability to promote equality and liberty seems small. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article’s systematic review of public disclosure tort cases suggests 
that while privacy torts are not dead yet, they are on life support. However, 
that same review suggests a method by which the public disclosure tort 
could be revitalized, disabling the secrecy double standard and enabling a 
more nuanced, contextual approach to determine whether the plaintiff has 
kept the information sufficiently out of public view and whether 
information has been sufficiently publicized to warrant damages. By 
demonstrating that the secrecy double standard is being applied to 
different kinds of plaintiffs in divergent ways and with disparate results, 
the Article lends weight to the principled, doctrinally-based injection of 
constitutional equality tenets into privacy tort law, justifying a softening 
of the secrecy double standard that limits so many privacy suits, 
particularly by those at the margins of society. More broadly, the Article’s 
analysis of the relationship between tort law and constitutional law helps 
chart a path forward toward common law equality.    
                                                     
265. See Michelman, supra note 143, at 422–30 (raising the specter that constitutionalization of 
tort law could result in conservative judicial forces prevailing over more progressive legislative 
values).  
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APPENDIX A: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
To locate and analyze public disclosure tort cases, the following 
research steps were utilized. 
 
STEP 1: APPLICATION OF SEARCH FILTERS 
 
To isolate likely relevant cases involving the public disclosure tort, the 
following filters were applied in Westlaw: 
x Database: Cases (all federal and state) 
x Search Terms: tort /p priva! /p (disclos! or public! or 
disseminat! or 652D) 
x Reported Cases: ONLY 
x Date Filter: 1/1/2006 to 5/24/2016 (inclusive) 
 
This yielded 1,526 decisions that were then subject to review pursuant 
to Step 2. NB: The Date Filter was applied AFTER the other search 
parameters were run and Westlaw’s algorithm had identified the 10,000 
most substantively relevant search results without date limitation 
(Westlaw only permits a maximum of 10,000 search results). If the Date 
Filter was applied simultaneously with the substantive search terms 
through the “Advanced” search interface, the search yielded roughly twice 
as many results, ~3,135 decisions. These additional 1,609 decisions were 
not reviewed, relying on the assumption that because they were not 
identified as within the top 10,000 substantively relevant results without 
date filtration, the likelihood that they would contain a meaningful 
number of public disclosure tort cases was small. In this sense, the 
research relied in part on the accuracy of the Westlaw search algorithm. 
Relatedly, it is important to note that Westlaw alters its algorithm over 
time, so the same search run today, might yield a slightly different number 
of cases than when it was run for this Article in May 2016. Moreover, as 
recent research has revealed, the major research database algorithms often 
yield different results, meaning that Westlaw’s results may be 
incomplete.266 
 
STEP 2: REVIEW & CODING BY RESEARCH ASSISTANTS 
 
The 1,526 decisions were then divided among three research assistants 
who read each case to determine if it was a public disclosure tort case, or 
                                                     
266. See Susan Nevelow Mart, The Algorithm as a Human Artifact: Implications for Legal 
[Re]Search, 109 LAW LIBRARY J. 387, 412–16 (2017) (empirically detailing divergent search results 
across major databases, including Westlaw and Lexis Advance).  
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closely related claim, and, if so, to code the case in excel spreadsheets 
across a variety of factors. These coded factors included: 
x Case Name 
x Citation 
x Court/Jurisdiction 
x Decision Date 
x Plaintiff’s Gender/Sex 
x Plaintiff’s Occupation 
x Plaintiff’s Race 
x Plaintiff’s Age 
x Plaintiff’s Sexual Orientation 
x Individual, State, or Corporate Defendant 
x Defendant’s Sex/Gender 
x Defendant’s Occupation 
x Defendant’s Race 
x Defendant’s Age 
x Defendant’s Sexual Orientation 
x Nature of Privacy Disclosure (E.g., sexual conduct, intimate 
body parts, sexual orientation/gender identity, 
medical/disability, social security number, criminal record, 
racial information, other) 
x Procedural Posture 
x Outcome (E.g., motion for summary judgment granted/denied, 
etc.) 
x Court’s Reasoning (E.g., Not Widely Disclosed, Already 
Public, Newsworthy, Not Offensive, Other (specify), etc.) 
x Size of Award (if any) 
x Use of Stereotypical Language by Court 
x Legal Claim Not Strictly Disclosure Tort? If So, What was 
Claim? 
x Egregious/Unfair Outcome? If So, Why? 
 
In many instances, meaningful demographic data on plaintiffs’ and 
defendants’ identities (e.g., their race, age, etc.) was not available in the 
decision itself and further research into the parties’ identities beyond the 
decision itself was not conducted. The lack of discussion regarding certain 
demographic factors prevents broad or statistically based claims 
suggesting that, for example, white plaintiffs tended to fare better than 
people of color, though, as discussed in Part II, there is qualitative 
comparative evidence suggesting that people of privilege—broadly 
defined—tended fare better in their public disclosure suits. 
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In total, the research assistants isolated and coded 306 decisions dealing 
with public disclosure torts or potential analogs (e.g., constitutional 
informational privacy claims, intrusion claims involving an elements of 
disclosure). These decisions were also KeyCited to capture any 
subsequent history that may have been relevant for inclusion. Throughout 
the research assistant review process, the assistants and the author had 
periodic check-ins to discuss questions regarding the review process and 
to help ensure uniformity in review methodology. 
 
STEP 3: QUALITY CONTROL REVIEW 
 
After the research assistants completed review and coding, the author 
re-reviewed their coding decisions on multiple occasions with particular 
attention to two factors: whether the case strictly involved a public 
disclosure case, or merely a related claim, and confirmed the courts’ 
reasons for decision. After quality control review, 155 “pure” public 
disclosure cases remained. Of course, even the author’s review involved 
close judgment calls about what to classify as a public disclosure tort case 
(e.g., for example, generally, cases from states without “common law” 
public disclosure tort cases but that had close statutory disclosure tort 
regimes, like New York, were often included). And, in some instances, 
there were close calls on how to classify the reason for judgment. Put 
differently, it is of course possible that human error and human 
subjectivity influenced the coding decisions at the margins. The numerical 
breakdown of the outcomes and reasoning in these 155 cases is detailed 
in Part II, Table 1, with more detailed analysis included in the case chart 
available at https://www.law.uw.edu/wlr/online-edition/scott-skinner-
thompson with further qualitative comparison among certain cases also 
discussed in Part II.267 While the Step 2 review attempted to catalogue the 
cases along a variety of demographic factors, because that information 
was not regularly available, the case chart collapses the relevant 
demographic data into a single column.   
 
 
                                                     
267. All told, the legal research methods employed here, and disclosure of those methods, appear 
robust compared to what is generally utilized and disclosed in legal academic literature and are 
consistent with more systematic methods recently advocated. See Baude et al., supra note 6; Hall & 
Wright, supra note 6. 
